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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the composition of the Spanish cabinet elites through different political re-
gimes and transition periods, those regimes including a constitutional monarchy, two democra-
cies, two dictatorships and a people’s Republic. The discontinuity of ministerial elites is the rule, 
with the relative exception of the two transition periods in the early 1930s and the middle 1970s. 
The elite in general is fairly heterogeneous, recruited more or less from the whole country and not 
dominated by a particular age cohort. In terms of occupational background, the important pres-
ence of civil servants, professors, military officers and professionals, generally characterized the 
elite. Many if not most of them would be of middle class milieus, sometimes upper sometimes 
middle-middle class. Apparently, not many were businessmen, farmers or landowners without an-
cillary occupation -like the German Junkers - and practically none were from manual worker-
trade unionist backgrounds, like many of the Labour Party MPs in Britain. The professional back-
grounds suggest that ideas, ideologies, mentalities, and legal thinking were as or more important 
than the representation of economic or class interests. For each period attention has been paid to 
the most relevant aspects of the institutional framework, party system and cabinet structure, as 
well as the extent of elite replacement and –when applicable- the nature of regime change. PERIODIZATION, REGIMES AND THE NATURE OF REGIME CHANGES IN 
CONTEMPORARY SPAIN 
 
Following the ‘revolt of Aranjuez,’ Charles IV abdicated in March 1808 and his son Ferdinand 
acceded to the Spanish crown. On 5 May 1808 both resigned the crown to Napoleón, who put his 
brother on the Spanish throne and enacted the Estatuto de Bayona (Bayonne Statute), a pseudo-
liberal charter. Resistance to the French led to the formation of provincial juntas that constituted 
the Junta Central, which convened a unicameral parliament in Cadiz which included representa-
tion from both metropolitan and overseas Spain, and which enacted a liberal constitution that was 
to be particularly influential in Portugal, Italy and the Spanish colonies in America. The French 
Revolution had a significant impact in Spain, notably on the work of the Cortes of Cadiz, includ-
ing the change from estate to national representation, and the introduction of equal citizenship. 
Although a large part of the elite accepted the ideas of constitutional government, on his return 
from France in 1814, Ferdinand VII refused to accept the Constitution of Cadiz and established 
absolute rule. In 1820, an army pronunciamiento sent to put down the rebellion in Latin America, 
forced him to swear to uphold the Constitution: however, with the help of the Holy Alliance, he 
soon reestablished absolutism. Only after the death of the king in 1833 was the Ancién Regime 
defeated in Spain, although not without a long war of succession between his brother, Don Car-
los, and the supporters of his daughter, Isabel II, which was also a war between the defenders of 
absolutism and the special role of the Catholic church and traditional institutions, and those of 
liberalism. Nevertheless, the fight against the traditionalist reaction would continue for almost a 
half century, after two further wars in 1846-49 and 1872-76 (Carr 1982; Linz et.al. 2000: 371-2). 
 
From then to the present, Spain has known the following periods and regimes: 
 
1833-1868: Isabeline Period:  
•   A constitutional monarchy superficially outlined by the Estatuto Real (Royal Statute) enacted 
in 1834, and largely regulated through the Constitutions of 1837 and 1845, with two con-
secutive Regencies (of María Cristina and General Espartero respectively) before the heiress 
ascended to the throne. 
 
1868-1874: Six-year Revolution (Sexenio): 
•   Revolutionary period (1968-1871): overthrow followed by provisional government and a new 
Regency of Serrano.  
•   Parliamentary monarchy as outlined in the 1869 Constitution granting universal suffrage, and 
which had only one monarch, Amadeo of Savoy (November 1871-February 1873). 
•   First Republic (February 1873-January 1874), federal and extremely unstable, born as par-
liamentarian and evolving to a presidential regime in a constitutional project that never re-
ceived approval. 
•   De facto dictatorship (January-December 1874): centralist, authoritarian and conservative 
disguised as republican and considered to be the Spanish version of MacMahon’s French 
Republic. 
 
1874-1931: First Bourbon Restoration 
•   A liberal oligarchic constitutional monarchy, although in many respects – particularly during 
its first half – close to a parliamentary regime compatible with both restricted and universal 
male suffrage between 1876 and 1923. 
•   Ministery-Regency (1874-1875) 
•   Reign of Alfonso and Regency of María Cristina (1875-1902) 
•   Constitutional reign of Alfonso XIII (1902-1923)   2
•   Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930): military corporatist. Dictablanda (weak dicta-
torship).
1  
 
1931-1936: Second Republic 
•   A liberal democratic parliamentary/semi-presidential regime until the outbreak of the Civil 
War. 
 
1936-1939: Second Republic during the Civil War 
•   A regime that probably bore little relation to liberal democracy, although it would insistently 
be presented as such by most of its defenders. 
 
1936-1975: Franco Regime 
•   Strong totalitarian tendencies evolving into authoritarianism. 
 
1975 to present: Second Restoration in the person of Juan Carlos I of Bourbon.
2  
•   Transition to democracy (November 1975-July 1977).
3 
•   Parliamentary monarchy (July 1977-date).
4 
 
Regime change in Spain followed different paths during the past 150 years:  
 
a)  pronunciamiento, when the constitutional monarchy of Isabel II was put to an end in 1868, 
and when her dynasty was restored six years later by her son Alfonso;  
b)  conventional coup d´état, resulting in the dissolution of parliament, both in January 1874 and 
September 1923;  
c)  quick and incredibly peaceful substitution of the salient, exhausted regime through the 
smooth elite-led transfer of power following the overwhelming defeat of monarchist candi-
dates at the 1931 local elections in Madrid and virtually all provincial capitals, heralding the 
arrival of the Second Republic;  
d)  military uprising followed by a bloody civil war in the case of Francoism, a regime that was 
fully institutionalized in December 1966 with the approved by referendum of the Ley Or-
gánica del Estado (Organic State Law), an instrument designed to establish the Francoist 
‘constitution’ that had been accumulating since 1938 in the form of Leyes Fundamentales 
(Fundamental Laws); and  
e)  transition through reforma pactada/ruptura pactada, when democracy was reestablished in 
Spain after four decades of dictatorship (Linz and Stepan 1996: Ch.6). 
 
As a bitter paradox for Franco’s more enthusiastic followers, the key instrument for the last re-
gime change in Spain through that successful formula would be an eighth fundamental law: the 
Law for Political Reform, which was promoted by Adolfo Suárez only a few weeks after being 
appointed Prime Minister in July 1976 by King Juan Carlos – who had himself been designated 
successor by the Caudillo. Bypassing this norm that allowed for the creation of a completely dif-
ferent type of legislative body – following free elections with the participation of political parties, 
which were then to be to be legalized – the members of the corporatist Cortes (the legislature 
created by the dictator in 1942 and partially appointed by him) committed hara-kiri only two 
days before the first anniversary of Franco’s death. Once approved by referendum a few days 
later, the road to democracy was open, even if there were still some serious obstacles to be over-
come.   3
SCOPE OF THIS STUDY AND SOURCES CONSULTED 
 
The Spanish Consejo de Ministros (Council of Ministers) can trace its origins to the Junta Su-
prema del Estado (Supreme State Council) that was created, and later abolished, by Charles III in 
the late eighteenth century. After the French invasion and subsequent War of Independence a 
cabinet, roughly similar in its general characteristics to that of the present, acquired formal exis-
tence. Curiously enough, this cabinet was to emerge at the beginning of the Spanish monarchy’s 
last despotic period, during the so-called ‘ominous decade,’ and not in the short periods of free-
dom and Constitutionalism of the final years of Ferdinand VII’s reign.
5 The Council of Ministers 
and its Prime Minister, already as constitutional organs separate from the Crown, would acquire 
constitutional rank through the Estatuto Real (Royal Statute) and subsequent Constitutions. (Only 
during two short periods, in the early stages of Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, and later, during 
the Civil War until early 1938 in Nationalist Spain, did that organ disappear.
6) The first steps to-
wards the creation of a cabinet that was relatively independent of the Head of State can be dated 
from 1834 (during monarchical periods, only the cabinets of Amadeo of Savoy and, following the 
introduction of the 1978 Constitution, of Juan Carlos I were either largely or totally independent 
of the monarch).  
 
Considering those facts, one possible choice could be to include in our study all the ministers, 
either from 1823 or 1834, or, at least, from 1851 – the year in which the old denomination Secre-
tario de Estado (Secretary of State) for identifying cabinet members disappeared.
7 Another alter-
native could be to start in September 1868 with the first government of the Gloriosa Revolución 
(Glorious Revolution), since this belated bourgeois revolution, through its proclamation of na-
tional sovereignty and its logical correlations – universal suffrage and the largely symbolic redefi-
nition of the role of the Head of State – heralded the beginning of the liberal-democratic cycle in 
Spain. However, maintaining the first consolidated regime criteria adopted by the directors of the 
present work, we decided to begin with the first government of the first Restoration in 1874, since 
none of the preceding regimes were even minimally consolidated.
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As Linz has stated, the political system established in that year, and reflected in the 1876 Consti-
tution, was successful in this and other aspects: ‘After a period of rapid political democratization, 
turmoil, localism encouraged by a Federal Republican ideology, and a revival of Carlist insur-
gency, the Restoration represents a period of peace, relative stability, considerable civil liberties, 
significant but insufficient economic progress, formal democracy – despite the survival of oligar-
chic structures, [and] a center-right compromise between clericalism and the anticlerical tenden-
cies so dominant at the time in Europe’ (Linz et.al. 2000: 373). 
 
From the inauguration of the first Restoration cabinet in 1874 until the last reshuffle of the second 
Aznar government in early July 2002, a total of 647 people have, at some time, occupied the 
office of minister or President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) – or both – in a total 
of 1573 positions at the summit of the executive. They were distributed as follow: 117 (Ministry 
Regency, Alfonso XII, and Regency of María Cristina); 158 (parliamentary period under Alfonso 
XIII); 36 (Primo’s Civil Directory and Dictablanda); 89 (Second Republic, April 1931-Ju1y 
1936); 46 (Second Republic during the Civil War); 120 (Franco’s Regime); 33 (transition to de-
mocracy); and 130 (Parliamentary Monarchy). During these 127 years, there have been a total of 
42 different Prime Ministers and more than 110 cabinets (see Table 1). 
   4
Table 1: Number of cabinets, ministers and incumbencies, 1874-2002
*  
  Cabinets Prime  Ministers  Ministers
1  Incumbencies 
  First time 
PM  Newcomers 
  N N  N % N  N %  N 
Constitutional Monarchy-I 
Ministry Regency/Alphonse 
XII/Regency (1874-1902) 
25 7  6  85.7  117  90  76.9  284 
Constitutional Monarchy-II 
Alphonse XIII (1902-23)  36 16  13  81.3  158  123  77.8 407 
Civil Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
(1925-31) 
3 3  3  100.0  36  24  66.6  51 
II Republic 
(1931-36)  19 9  9  100.0  89  86  96.6  238 
II Republic during Civil War 
(1936-39)  6 4  3  75.0  46  31  67.4  83 
Franco Regime 
(1938-75)  11 3  3  100.0  120  118  98.3  207 
Transition to democracy 
(1975-77)  2 2  1  50.0  33  28  84.8  49 
Parliamentary Monarchy 
(1977-2001)  9 4  3  75.0  130  120  92.3  254 
Total  114
2 42
3    674
4    1573
5 
* From 31 December 1874 to 9 July 2002. 
1Including Prime Ministers 
2 We considered a new cabinet was inaugurated every time a Prime Minister was appointed by the Head of State, even if the person 
was a reappointment from the previous cabinet. However, we made three exceptions: Negrín’s Civil War cabinet, because of the many 
and substantial changes to its composition in April 1938, in the so-called Gobierno de Unidad Nacional; Suárez’s July 1977 cabinet, 
following the first free elections since 1936; and, for practical reasons, the Franco regime in which the General was the head of 
government until 1973 (in this case the criteria adopted was the numerically relevant change of positions, except for the cabinet in-
augurated in September 1942 because of the highly political significance of certain inclusions and removals in the April 1939 Go-
bierno de la Paz. 
3 Number of people appointed Prime Minister. This figure excludes duplications, as few individuals were Prime Ministers in two dif-
ferent periods. 
4 Number of people appointed minister. This figure excludes duplications since few individuals were ministers in two, or even three 
(just one case), of the periods considered. 
5 Every single ministerial appointment of an individual (whether for the same or for a different post) was counted, except for General 
Franco.
  
 
Data published by the historians José Cuenca and Soledad Gallego (1998), including the usual so-
ciobiographical variables up to the first Aznar government, as well those patiently gathered by 
Juan J. Linz and Rocío Terán during many years, and material on the Franco regime that was 
published by Miguel Jerez, have been used as the main sources in the construction of our data-
base (press reports and the Presidency of the Government’s website have been used to extract in-
formation on more recent cabinets).
9  
 
For data concerning the party identification of ministers and Prime Ministers appointed before the 
Civil War, we have relied on Tusell (1990); while for the ‘political families’ of Franco’s min-
isters we have used Alvarez Puga et al. (1970), De Miguel (1975), Jerez (1982), and the military 
yearbooks. José Ramón Urquijo’s recent publication (2001) offers an exhaustive guide to cabi-
nets, ministerial appointments, dismissals, and departments, which allowed us to complete and 
review our database in this respect. In order to verify the previous condition of parliamentary 
representatives – and the number of legislatures in each case – the following sources were used: 
for the lower or single chambers: J. Paredes et al., Los diputados del Congreso español, 1811-
1939,
10 and the computerized listings of the Congreso de los Diputados (1977-2001); for the up-  5
per house, we used Próceres y Senadores, 1834-1923, and Senadores, 1977-1993 (Madrid, Sen-
ado, Secretaría General, 1993), and its computerized lists and web page for more recent years. In 
order to detect those ministers who during the past six decades have been previously appointed or 
– more exceptionally – elected members to Franco’s Cortes, we relied on Maestre (1977), whose 
data continue to November 1976. 
 
In general terms, relatively good primary sources are available for ministers during the Franco 
Regime – and for those of the Second Republic. However, the sources for the First Restoration 
period are poor and unreliable. Conversely, secondary sources are adequate up until the first years 
of the present democracy, although there is a shortage of biographies, with even Prime Ministers 
being reluctant to publish their personal memoirs.  
 
MAIN FEATURES OF THE DIFFERENT REGIMES 
 
In this section we consider the most relevant traits related with our topic for each of the five po-
litical regimes that have existed since 1874: constitutional arrangements – primarily those con-
cerning the executive branch of government, but also others, such as the role of parliament and 
electoral regulations; the party system; and the cabinet structure and composition (including the 
continuity/discontinuity of political elites). It would be particularly interesting to analyze the first 
government of each regime – as well as those of the transition periods – since they represent a 
founding elite that did not emerge out of a democratically elected legislature. They derive their 
authority from the institutions of the previous regime, or from a revolution or coup d´état. Since 
they appear at moments of crisis, they generate or consolidate a new leadership. Regarding the 
party system, there are at least two good reasons for emphasising its relevance in order to study 
the ministers of the different regimes being considered here (although probably not so much for 
Franco’s Regime): on the one hand, there is an obvious difference between a regime in which a 
one-party cabinet is the regular pattern and another in which a coalition cabinet is the norm; on 
the other hand, attention must be paid to the fact that ministerial duration – something that is 
highly relevant when attempting to discover the ‘regular’ traits of the individual occupying these 
positions during a specific period – is normally associated with cabinet duration. As Daalder and 
Lijphart, among others, have pointed out, cabinet duration has often accounted for such charac-
teristics as the fractionalization of parliamentary parties, the number of parties in cabinets, and the 
coalition status of governments (Blondel and Thiébault 1991: 79). 
 
Just as in France and most other European countries, the first revolutionary experience did not 
lead to the consolidation of a stable political system in Spain. Following a period of radicalism, 
followed by a transitory return to absolutism on two different occasions, Spanish constitutional-
ism was forced to incorporate a political formula that recognized the crown’s strong preeminence 
within the political process. After a short and politically unsatisfactory period (1834-37) during 
which the Cortes surrendered its legislative initiative, a more stable system that was based on a 
distribution of power acceptable to both sides was constructed under the Constitutional Monar-
chy. Through this formula, the Crown obtained a new prerogative: the so-called poder moderador 
(moderating authority) that was constitutionally delimited in other countries (i.e., Brazil and Por-
tugal), although not in Spain, where it inspired constitutional practice without ever becoming a 
norm (Artola 1990:182-3). This means that Prime Ministers were freely appointed and dismissed 
by the Head of State, who also retained the right, within certain bounds, to suspend and dissolve 
parliament, approve laws, and a limited veto. As a counterweight, parliament could approve or 
reject cabinets through the exercise of its vote of confidence. In the case of a conflict between 
cabinet and parliament, the King was the ultimate arbitrator, with the authority to change the 
cabinet’s composition and bring it closer to the Cortes’s opinion, and to dissolve parliament in 
order to verify if it continued to have the support of the electorate. Ministers were, therefore,   6
subject to both royal and parliamentary confidence, although the former was much more decisive. 
The 1837 Constitution inaugurated the Constitutional Monarchy, and, according to some 
interpretations, was a model that remained in force until 1923, since the Constitutions of 1845, 
1869 and 1876 only introduced minor modifications (Artola 1988: 153).  
 
In our view, however, the 1869 Constitution outlined a democratic parliamentary monarchy, even 
if the parliamentary system was limited by the fact that the cabinet required royal approval in 
addition to having the confidence of the Cortes. Legislative authority was an exclusive compe-
tence of a parliament that was, with the exception of the indirectly elected Senate, elected by di-
rect universal male suffrage. Nevertheless, it must be accepted that this Constitution had almost 
no genuine effect during the four years of its theoretical validity (Sánchez Agesta 1974: 329 ff). 
 
It must be emphasized that, until the first breakdown of liberal constitutionalism in 1923, the dif-
ference between progressive and moderate situations – whatever the specific name of the parties
11 
– was determined by the organic laws rather than by the Constitution.
12 Parties on the left, with 
different names and ideologies throughout the century, were in favor of national sovereignty and 
fought to consolidate an electoral regime that was more open to popular participation, succeeding 
in obtaining the definitive introduction of direct universal male suffrage in 1890;
13 they also 
fought for press freedom, greater freedom of speech, and for the election of mayors by the elected 
councillors rather than their appointment by the government. Conversely, parties on the liberal 
right were in favor of granting powers to the Crown, a bicameral parliament, and a restricted 
franchise. A succession of organic laws, which were occasionally accompanied by changes in the 
Constitution that were more apparent that real, was the usual practice throughout the different 
phases of political conflict. Electoral manipulation thus became the real factor that differentiated 
Spain’s political experience from that of the other European countries that had similar political 
formulas at that time (Artola 1988: 153 ff). 
 
During the first decades of the Constitutional Monarchy, neither the two Regents nor Queen Isa-
bel II were willing or able to play the role of the neutral and moderating power that was the prem-
ise for regime consolidation under those historical circumstances. Isabel II only rarely, and never 
after the appointment of General Espartero in 1854, permitted the formation of liberal progressive 
cabinets, and even when she did, they were always of short duration since she was afraid that they 
represented a serious threat to the throne, given that they were supported by the so-called 
demócratas, who tended towards republicanism.
14 As a result of their exclusion from cabinet, the 
representatives of those social sectors stood strongly against electoral corruption and the sham 
parliamentary system and decided to withdraw from the political system and pursue the revo-
lutionary route. The revolution finally broke out in September 1868, and the Queen was forced 
into exile. A new electoral law granting universal male suffrage was passed in November of that 
same year. The Cortes that was elected a few months later approved the 1869 Constitution, and 
after considerable manoeuvering and in the face of much international tension, Amadeo of Savoy 
was elected King of Spain in November 1870. The new king retained the same powers of 
arbitration and supervision of the other institutional powers that had been enjoyed by his pre-
decessor, although now these powers were held in the name of national sovereignty and not that 
of the shared sovereignty of the monarchy and parliament that was characteristic of the previous 
regime. Seven cabinets and four Prime Ministers came and went in quick succession before Ama-
deo ended his twenty-five-month reign by abdicating. The King had become increasingly discour-
aged by the attacks on him that were emanating from both from the right – including the anti-
system Carlists – and the left; he was also disappointed at losing the support of all the main 
parties except Ruíz Zorrilla’s Radicals.
15 A federal Republic was immediately proclaimed. The 
new regime had four Prime Ministers and seven different cabinets in the course of one year, and 
had to confront a Carlist uprising and a rebellion of extremist federal Republicans. In January   7
1874, parliament was closed by a general, and the unsuccessful attempts at creating a new consti-
tution came to an end. A new provisional government, led by General Serrano, was appointed.  
 
Serrano had already held this position following the triumph of the September Revolution, and he 
had also been one of Isabel II’s most prominent ministers. Before 1874 had ended, Serrano was in 
turn overthrown by a pronunciamiento that proclaimed Alfonso XII king.
16 The Sexenio certainly 
brought about a new liberal-democratic cycle in Spanish constitutionalism. It represented a break 
insofar as it resulted in the recognition of new rights, the extension of electoral suffrage and an 
increase in the number of guarantees. 
 
The fact that sixty-nine of the seventy-four ministers of this period obtained cabinet position for 
the first time during these years also demonstrates how the Sexenio represented a break with the 
past: however, it would be a mistake to believe that these elites represented a complete disconti-
nuity, since a significant number of ministers (35.1 percent) had been parliamentary deputies dur-
ing the previous regime (28.4 percent, if we leave aside those who had been deputies only during 
the legislature that opened following the 1854 revolution). Less than half of the members of the 
Constituent Cortes of 1869 were newcomers, while the thirteen portfolios held by the five indi-
viduals who had previously been ministers under Queen Isabel covered important areas, such as 
Foreign Affairs (2), Interior (2), Finance (1), War (2), and Navy (3), as well as occupying the 
Prime Minister’s office. 
 
After the short life of the First Republic, both the monarchy and the Bourbon dynasty were rees-
tablished under the new king. The leading Alfonsine politician, Cánovas, who in August 1873 ob-
tained full power from the crown to lead the restoration movement, and who would have prefer-
red a transition without military intervention, set about constructing a new liberal constitutional 
monarchy modelled on the British example. With this purpose in mind, 600 former legislators 
were consulted (excluding the republicans – most of whom were in exile). They accepted the 
basic outline of the future Constitution and formed a thirty-nine-man commission (later reduced 
to thirty-eight) that was charged with preparing the draft constitutional document (Linz 1967: 
202; Torres del Moral 1990: 135-6). Following a new election, with universal suffrage, the 1876 
Constitution was enacted, and remained in force until 1923. The extent of electoral suffrage was 
restricted in 1878. 
 
Following the King’s death, the Queen Regent called upon Sagasta, the Liberal leader, to form a 
government; he reintroduced universal male suffrage in June 1890, increasing the size of the elec-
torate from 807,000 in 1886 to 4,100,000 (participation had fluctuated considerably after 
universal suffrage was originally introduced: from 70 percent in 1868 to 46 percent in the election 
of 1872. It now declined to 50 percent before increasing to a maximum of 67 percent during the 
Restoration period). The Regency lasted until Alfonso XIII’s assumption of power in 1902. After 
the 1923-30 dictatorship, and the period of uncertainty from 1930-31, Alfonso XIII was to leave 
the country following the proclamation of the Second Republic. 
 
Cánovas and Sagasta were already veteran political leaders by the onset of the new regime, both 
having been elected deputies almost continuously since 1854. Both men had the personality and 
capacity to decide. Among the 117 ministers and Prime Ministers of the first half of the Restora-
tion, twenty-seven had occupied the same position either during the Sexenio or under Isabel II 
(and one had been a minister during both periods). In the 1879 legislature, the first one that was 
elected by the restricted suffrage reintroduced by Cánovas, a similar proportion of deputies (23 
percent) had obtained parliamentary experience prior to Alfonso XII’s return (the proportion was 
higher on the Liberal benches, but was also significant among the minority dissidents). In this 
respect, the first period of the Restoration, despite being a regime change, represented much less 
of a break and discontinuity with the political classes of the past than is true of the twentieth   8
century regime changes we will analyze below – with just two exceptions at the cabinet level: the 
time between Primo de Rivera’s Dictatorship and the Second Republic; and the Second Republic 
during the Civil War (Linz 1972; Linz et.al. 2000: 379-81) (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Continuity of ministers through different periods 
Constitu-
tional 
 Monarchy 
Second  
Republic 
 
I II 
Civil  
Directorate / 
Dictablanda 
 Civil 
War 
Francoism Transition 
to 
democracy 
Parlia-
mentary  
Monarchy 
  -1868  11  1             
1868-1874  17  4 0          
1874-1902  91  35 1  0         
1902-1923   123  11 3  0       
1925-1931     24  0 0  2     
1931-1936       86  15 0  0   
1936-1939         31  0 0  0 
1938-1975          118  5 1 
1975-1977            28  8 
1977-2001              121 
Total 117  150  36  89  45  120 33  130 
 
The Restoration was a time during which the legislature was able to enact much of the basic legal 
framework of Spanish government and administration, although not to solve many of the basic 
political problems, particularly the regional and social questions. It was also a period in which, at 
least initially, the army withdrew from active interference in politics. It was an intentional com-
promise designed to slow down the process of revolutionary mobilization without rejecting mod-
ern European political institutions. The last effort to retain control of Cuba and the Philippines, 
and the war with the United States that ended with Spain’s defeat in 1898, led to a profound crisis 
that was reflected not so much within the parties and political elites, but in the rise of peripheral 
nationalisms, and the intellectual critique of the system (Linz et.al. 2000: 372-3). Parliament, the 
power of which could have been greatly expanded due to the ambiguities of the Restoration con-
stitution between 1876 and 1923, lost power to the monarch. Heads of Government frequently 
found their authority undermined by the Head of State: in the twenty-one years between 1902 and 
1923, there were thirty-two Prime Ministers, and thirty-six governments with an average life of 
approximately seven months (Tables 1 and 3).  
 
The causes of this process are difficult to explain. Some attribute it to the personality of Alfonso 
XIII, while others emphasize the absence of solid governmental majorities, incompatibilities and 
personal vendettas between politicians (even of the same party), extra-parliamentary pressures 
from the streets, civil society associations (including the Freemasons), and, ultimately, the army. 
Not one of the democratic forces was able to force a Constitutional revision that would limit royal 
authority, democratize the Senate and restrain the growing veto power of the army (which had 
initially accepted the system) (Linz 1967: 202).   
Table 3: Number of cabinets, party dominating, duration and size 
 
Nº of cabinets  Dominant party 
Avg. duration 
(months) 
Nº of ministers 
(min:max) 
Constitutional Monarchy-I 
  31.12.1874–13.2.1875  1  C  1.4  9 
  13.2.1875–17.5.1902  24  12 C [11+1]
* 
12 L [11+1] 
13.6 9
1 
Constitutional Monarchy-II 
  17.5.1902–13.9.1923  36  16 C [14+2] 
20 L [18+2] 
7.3 9:10 
Civil Directorate / Dictablanda 
  3.12.1925–14.4.1931  3  None  17.9
2  9:11 
II Republic 
  14.4.1931–18.7.1936  19  4 Left bourgeois / socialist 
10 Center-right/right 
2 Presidential 
3 Left bourgeois 
3.4 10:15 
II Republic Civil War 
  18.7.1936–1.4.1939  6  1 None
** 
5 Left bourgeois
* /PSOE / PCE/ PNV / Anarchist
*** 
5.5 9:18 
Franco Regime 
  31.1.1938–12.12.1975  11  Non-party government  41.9  13:23 
Transition to democracy 
  12.12.1975–8.7.1977  2  None  9.8  21:22 
Parliamentary Monarchy  9 3  UCD 
4 PSOE 
2 PP 
34.7
3  15:26 
* The second figure inside the bracket refers to the number of coalition cabinets; 
** One day cabinet; 
*** Only in the second cabinets of both Largo Caballero and Negrín (Nov. 1936 and Aug. 1938, respectively). 
C=Conservador; L=Liberal; PCE=Partido Comunista de España; PNV=Partido Nacionalista Vasco; PP=Partido Popular; PSOE=Partido Socialista Obrero Español; UCD=Unión de Centro Democrático. 
1 Except for the first Silvela cabinet, form in April 1899, in which the number of cabinet members fell to seven as a result of the assumption of the portfolio of State by the prime ministers himself, and the suppres-
sion of the Ministerio de Ultramar following the lost of the last colonies in America, and Philipines. 
2 One would have to distinguish the Civil Directorate of Primo de Rivera and the shorter two transition cabinets after his dismissal. 
3 The ninth cabinet (Aznar-II) inaugurated in April 2000 was excluded of this computation even if it could be taken for granted that -in normal conditions- it will last until the end of the legislature, in the year 2004. 
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The Restoration is normally considered to have been an oligarchic regime in which personal and 
familiar links were commonplace among members of the political class. Political clientelism (ca-
ciquismo) was the rule (Varela Ortega 1977; Robles Egea 1996). However, most of the 240 peo-
ple who occupied the highest positions in the executive were professional politicians who fre-
quently demonstrated a considerable degree of independence from external pressures groups. Cer-
tainly, there was no divorce between economic interests and the political elites, as studies by 
Tuñón de Lara (1967) and others have clearly demonstrated, and nor was there a systematic sub-
ordination of the politicians to organized interest groups. Looking at the most senior level of the 
executive, we see that only eleven out of a total of twenty-five individual Prime Ministers be-
tween 1868 and 1915 were of high social origin. The remainder were from middle-class back-
grounds, including Cánovas and Sagasta, who between them governed for a total of twenty-two 
years – nearly one-half of this whole period.
17 Only one Prime Minister was a member of the no-
bility, twelve were lawyers, eight were military officers, four were university professors (includ-
ing two professors of law), and one was an engineer (Cabrera and Rey Reguillo 2002: 100-1; and 
our own data).  
 
The revolutionary experience of 1868 had made the Crown more amenable to a certain degree of 
political openness, offering its support in turn to the two dynastic parties that appeared in 1874 as 
the inheritors of the main political parties of Isabel II’s reign: the Conservative (Liberal Conser-
vador – Liberal Conservative) and Liberal (Liberal Fusionista – Liberal Fusion) parties. All other 
parties had neither sufficient representation or popular support to be relevant in the formation of 
government in the Sartorian sense. In addition most of them excluded themselves from the 
system. Conflicts developed at the social level, however, with long-term consequences for the sta-
bility of the political system.  
 
The Restoration system remained a two-party one until the 1910s when, following the deaths of 
the principal architects of the turno pacífico (the agreement to rotate in office regardless of the 
election result),
18 Cánovas (who was assassinated) and Sagasta, it experienced a major crisis, with 
both the Liberals and, later, the Conservatives, splitting into factions that often defined them-
selves as political parties in their own right. The resulting tensions enhanced the King’s position 
as arbiter, enabling him to choose who should be Prime Minister and prevent others, even those 
such as the Conservative leader, Maura, who had parliamentary support, rising to power (Linz 
1967b: 202 ff; Linz et.al. 2000).  
 
For some years the changing tendencies follow a similar path, and one-party government contin-
ued to be the rule until the crisis of 1917 that opened the way to the first coalition government of 
Alfonso XIII’s reign (the only precedent occurred in 1884, when Cánovas’s fifth government in-
cluded representation from the rightist Unidad Católica, which was also the first government to 
incorporate a regionalist party with the inclusion of the Catalan Lliga Regionalista). Three further 
coalition cabinets followed between 1921 and 1923, which included members of such parties as 
the Partido Liberal Demócrata, Liberal Progresista, Izquierda Liberal – all factions of the Lib-
erals; the Mauristas – which resulted from the division of the Conservatives; as well as the Lliga 
Regionalista, and the Reformists. In total, 92 percent of the Constitutional Monarchy’s govern-
ments, over a period of almost fifty years, were one-party governments (Table 3). 
 
During the first phase of the new Constitutional Monarchy, the alternation of power between 
Conservatives and Liberals worked reasonably well, with twenty-five cabinets in twenty-eight 
years. 
 
The changes in government were not so much the result of changes in the electorate’s preferences 
as they were product of the King granting the Prime Minister the power of dissolution, and the 
practice whereby the Minister of the Interior classified the candidates and then exerted his in-  11
fluence to ensure a majority while safeguarding the other party’s representation and that of the 
minorities. Voter apathy and indifference, more than coercion and electoral fraud, allied with the 
conviction of the ‘dynastic’ parties’ politicians that they would not be excluded form access to 
power for too long, allowed caciquismo and turnismo to function (Varela 1996). To a certain ex-
tent it reflected the failure and exhaustion of the previous government, and a hope for some 
change: it was, in a sense, a ‘perverse’ form of consociational politics. 
 
The competition for power between the Conservatives and the Liberals was largely reduced to a 
conflict between ‘ins’ and ‘outs,’ that was, according to the critics, controlled by the Ministry of 
Interior’s corrupt electoral practices. Neither party presented any real policy alternative or repre-
sented any distinctive social interest. Although there is much truth in this image, our research 
suggests that, at least since 1902, ministers and deputies of the two parties were not exactly two 
sides of the same coin. There are two questions requiring an answer. They are: why, given the 
social changes taking place, did these parties not become more differentiated from each other? 
And, since they had failed to represent the new social groups and their opinions, why were they 
not displaced during the 1920s by powerful new anti-system parties, like the Republicans or the 
Socialists? Following the extension of the franchise in Italy in 1913, both the Socialist Party and 
the Populari obtained a significant parliamentary representation. Their inability to achieve a pro-
portional representation within government was largely a result of their refusal to join, and a 
consequence of the difficulties involved in forming coalitions. The absence of the Spanish So-
cialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español – PSOE) in Spanish cabinets prior to 1923, how-
ever, was a direct result of their lack of representation in the Cortes; although the increasing im-
portance of regionalist, nationalist and separatist parties in some of Spain’s regions was certainly 
another factor that accounts for the failure of these parties. 
 
The Restoration’s two-party system began to disintegrate during Alfonso XIII’s reign, with no 
opposition party emerging to fill the resulting vacuum. Instead, the principal parties fragmented. 
The Conservatives split into two, with some following Maura and the rest – the idóneos, who 
were ready to participate in government – following Dato. Following the assassination of Cana-
lejas, the Liberals divided into rival personalist factions led by Romanones, Santiago Alba and 
García Prieto. In the meantime, the nature of the armed forces’ presence within government was 
changing; for while there were fewer military ministers overall, they were increasingly responsi-
ble for civilian portfolios (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Military occupying ministerial portfolios (%)
* 
  Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Civil 
Directorate / 
Dictablanda 
Second  
Republic 
Franco 
Regime 
Transition to 
Democracy 
Parlia-
mentary 
Monarchy 
 I  II      Civil 
War 
    
Military portfolios 
only
** 
30 24  5  4  4  18  4  1 
Military and 
civilians 
2 0  0  0  0 0  2  1 
Civilian only  3  12  9  0  0  22  2  1 
Total military  35  36  14  4  4  40  8  3 
Percentage of total 
ministers 
29.9 22.8  38.9  4.5  8.7  33.3  24.2  2.3 
N 117  158  36  89  46  120  33  130 
N= Number of cases in each category. 
* Portfolios held ad interim have not been counted. Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. 
** Until May 1937 there were two military ministries: War and Navy (Navy and Air from early September 1936 until its integration in 
a single National Defense Ministry eight months later). Under Franco the original Defense Ministry split in three different departments 
–Ejército, Marina and Aire – when the General made up his second cabinet in August 1939. With the new democracy a single Defense   12
Ministry was re-established in July 1977. The legal staff members of the armed services are counted as military but most of them had 
other career in civilian life before being appointed to the cabinet: under Afonso XII and the Regency they were three; in the following 
period (1902-23), four; during the Civil Directorate/Dictablanda, two; under Franco, six; during the Transition, two; with the new 
democracy, the minister of Defense in the last Aznar cabinet (the only not strictly civilian reaching this position after the approval of 
the Constitution). 
 
Rather than parliament asserting itself and the parties becoming more powerful actors, Alfonso 
XIII’s influence on the political system grew during the 1910s. He established direct contacts 
with the armed forces, and encouraged an atmosphere of mistrust and conflict to emerge between 
the political leaders and their followers by supporting some and vetoing others. The combination 
of the distortion of the electoral process, the fragmentation of the leading parties and the mon-
arch’s meddling in the cabinet formation process meant that those forces that were either on the 
margins of, or external to, the dominant two-party system came to play an increasingly important 
role. The leaders of these forces had considerable prestige, and could, on occasions, work to-
gether to advocate constitutional reform. Despite their lack of parliamentary representation, three 
of their leaders – Cambó, Ventosa and Pedregal – were appointed to cabinet positions in 1917 
(Linz et.al. 2000: 384). 
 
The consequence of Alfonso XIII’s 1917 decision to ignore calls from dissenting parliamentari-
ans and discontented trade unions for an overhaul of the Restoration’s political system and an en-
largement of its social base, was to be felt in 1923, when he was confronted by a crisis that was 
caused by the political system’s lack of legitimacy. His only alternatives for the resolution of this 
crisis were either to lead a programme of reforms or to accept a military dictatorship.
19 
 
Following Primo de Rivera’s ‘Velvet Glove’ coup, the King urged the leader of the military 
movement to form a new cabinet. While Alfonso XIII had the right to nominate his own cabinet, 
the fact that parliament was not recalled within the time limits established by the Constitution al-
lows us to assess his action to have been unconstitutional. Originally shaped in the form of a Mil-
itary Directory, in which Primo de Rivera – a member of the agrarian aristocracy of Jerez who 
had recently come into the title of Marqués de Estella – reserved both access to the King and the 
authority to issue decrees to himself. Attempts were made to institutionalize the new regime after 
the dissolution of the Cortes, through the creation of a single official party and a consultative Na-
tional Assembly modelled loosely on the Italian fascist example. However, the chamber, which 
was established in 1927, had an extremely short life; and the single party never amounted to any-
thing more than a patriotic association led by generally apolitical men whose primary interest was 
to obtain power. Primo de Rivera’s regime, therefore, destroyed the legal-rational component of 
the 1876 constitutional compromise, and led many people, even members of the old party elites, 
to question the role of the Crown to such an extent that they were not prepared to defend it 
(Maura 1966; Seco 1969; Ben-Ami 1983; Linz 1987; Artola 1988; Linz et al. 2000).  
 
The Dictatorship’s institutional ambiguities were significant. The regime’s very existence was in 
profound and permanent violation of the 1876 Constitution, yet it made continuous reference to 
it, and the persistence of some of the Constitution’s formal elements were combined with a com-
plete lack of progressive institutional order and its persistence with ambitious constitutional pro-
jects. The regime was built on a tripartite base that included the Dictator, the King and the Army. 
Their reciprocal yet unequal relationships constituted the regime’s legal basis. In order to best un-
derstand the ‘real and effective constitution’ of the Dictatorship, however, it is first necessary to 
assess the relative strengths of the main social forces that successively informed it: the Catalan in-
dustrial bourgeoisie, the financial and land-owning members, and the Maurist bourgeoisie (fol-
lowers of the influential former Prime Minister who was the object of a Royal veto during the 
crisis of 1909). These forces initiated the regime’s ideological evolution, pushing it towards a tra-
ditional stance, thereby giving birth to the Dictatorship’s institutional projects. These politicians,   13
however, were unable to construct a constitutional formula that could appeal to the lower social 
classes while remaining acceptable to the middle and upper classes (Malerbe 1978). 
 
The Dictatorship perhaps precipitated, and certainly accelerated, the disintegration of the dynastic 
parties, hastening the disappearance of a political generation: an instrumental event leading to the 
establishment of the new Republic in 1931. When it made its first appearance in 1923, the Dic-
tatorship did not enjoy the support of a mass movement, and nor was it able to create a real single 
party of the type that was appearing in Europe at the time. Thanks to the Dictatorship’s tolerance 
towards both PSOE and its trade union federation, the Union General de Trabajadores (General 
Workers’ Union – UGT) – whose leaders Primo de Rivera had attempted to coopt – the party was 
able to build the foundations that would lead to its becoming a mass party during the Second 
Republic.  
 
This third period combines three quite distinct cabinets following the two year Military Directory 
(1923-25), in which both the position of minister and under-secretary were suppressed. The first 
of these was Primo de Rivera’s only civilian government (3 December 1925-30 January 1930). 
The second government (30 January 1930-18 February 1931) was that led by General Berenger, 
who was appointed to the position by the King following Primo de Rivera`s resignation. This 
government – 45 percent of whose members had already served in cabinet during the Constitu-
tional Monarchy – proceeded to introduce some limited liberalization. The third was Admiral Az-
nar’s short-lived government (18 February-14 April 1931), which was formed by political no-
tables – including several former Prime Ministers and cabinet ministers – with the task of man-
aging the transition to constitutional rule: a task in which they ultimately failed. Given these ‘in-
ternal’ distinctions within the period 1923-31, it is clear that, unlike the others in our study, there 
is no single identifiable regime type during these years.  
 
The Second Republic initially enjoyed extensive and enthusiastic popular support. Once the King 
left Spain, the Republicans who had in August 1930 signed the Pact of San Sebastián – a docu-
ment in which the signatories agreed to establish a revolutionary committee and recognized the 
need to grant Catalonia autonomous status – formed a Provisional Government. 
 
The arrival of the Second Republic meant overcoming the agony of the corrupt Restoration, of 
Miguel Primo de Rivera’s so-called ‘iron surgery,’ and the attempts to return to the absurdly de-
scribed ‘constitutional normality.’ The following analysis of Ramírez summarized the situation:  
 
The history and the events prevented any return to the past. There was a new 
class – the proletariat – which was much more virulent than that which 
should be expected in such a poorly industrialized country. The UGT and the 
CNT, both as protagonists and as new agents of change, arrived at the gates 
of political and economic power, just as the bourgeoisie had done at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. The intellectuals embarked on an ex-
tensive campaign in support of the Republic… The institutions of the mon-
archy suffered a catastrophic loss of prestige… Monarchists surrendered 
their ground to the Republic (no less a figure than Alcalá Zamora, who was 
supposed to assuage the fears of the Conservatives, became President of the 
new regime). A weak, but worthy republican bourgeoisie emerged, with 
Azaña at its head. The Republic was born, sponsored by such notable and 
varied patrons…, and was driven forward by the only seriously organized 
political party at that time: PSOE. Possibly once, when the time was right, 
and before it became diverted by its own internal factions, PSOE’s ‘big idea’ 
was to secure and maintain a Republic that was never to become a socialist   14
Republic – despite the accusations of the monarchist right: accusations that 
were echoed and amplified in the ABC newspaper. (Ramírez 2000: 40-1) 
 
In marked contrast to the Dictatorship, which had governed without introducing any substantial 
reforms, both the Republicans and the Socialists clearly favored innovation. In a political climate 
that was aggravated by the difficulties caused by the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the new political 
leaders experienced serious difficulties as they attempted to govern. They tried to resolve several 
long outstanding social and political problems, some of which had been ignored since they had 
first been raised during the country’s first democratic regime sixty years earlier. The Republic’s 
first concerns were: to improve working-class living conditions; to restructure the system of land 
ownership that condemned many peasant families in Andalucia and Extremadura to permanent 
misery and long periods of unemployment; to improve literacy rates and the sociocultural condi-
tion of women; to contain the presence of the Catholic Church; to restore balance to an army that 
had too many officers for its size; and to produce a political settlement to the demands for Catalan 
and Basque self-government (Linz 1973).  
 
While other European nations were able to achieve similar goals gradually, over decades, Spain’s 
new and inexperienced political class – in which 96.6 percent of ministers and approximately 85 
percent of deputies were novices
20 – sought to effect all of these changes almost immediately. 
 
The 1931 Constitution was conceived to be a key enabling instrument for these radical transfor-
mations. By advancing many elements of the social state formula, and representing the ideals of 
humanist socialism – at least in some of its key components – it heralded the beginning of a new 
democratic cycle in Spain after the failed experience of the Sexenio. While technically successful 
in some aspects, such as the regulation of the problem of the regions and the creation of the Tri-
bunal of Constitutional Guarantees (which influenced Italy’s reconstruction after the Second 
World War), the Constitution’s two major mistakes were related to its attempts to deal with the 
religious question and, as we shall see below, the formula that regulated the relationship between 
the branches of power: between the executive and the legislative branches in particular.  
 
These errors clearly contributed to the death of Spanish democracy, the last in a chain of Euro-
pean democratic breakdowns that affected Italy, Portugal, Germany, and Austria. This also ac-
counts for many of the distinctive features of the Spanish Republic’s crisis, including foreign in-
tervention in the Civil War. That Spanish democracy survived the rise of fascism in other coun-
tries helps explain Spanish’s socialism’s unique response, as well as the fact that Spain and Portu-
gal are the only countries in which the regimes established after the breakdown of democracy 
survived until 1976-77 and 1974, respectively. We should not forget that in both Spain and Por-
tugal, the army played a direct role in overthrowing the democratic regimes, bringing their ex-
perience much closer to the Latin American pattern. Spain’s relatively high degree of political 
mobilization is in marked contrast to the Portuguese and Latin American examples, however, and, 
in this respect at least, resembles the European cases. Perhaps more than in any other case except 
Italy, the deep social cleavages and conflicts lay behind Spain’s political crisis (Linz 1978: 142 
ff). 
 
The 1931 Constitution restored the unicameral parliamentary model of 1812, and although it cre-
ated a regionalized state (the Estado Integral), the bicameral system was rejected as it only re-
minded its framers of the Restoration Senate. During previous constitutional periods the cabinet 
had developed into an informal collegiate body that was separate from the Crown: the 1931 Con-
stitution institutionalized this separation for the first time. A complex system of checks and bal-
ances was created, leading to some functional confusions emerging between the President and the 
cabinet. The appointment of the Prime Minister and his cabinet was regulated by Section V 
(President of the Republic), article 75 of the Constitution:   15
 
The President of the Republic shall freely appoint and dismiss the Prime 
Minister, and on his proposal, the Ministers. He shall necessarily dismiss 
them in the event that members of Cortes explicitly deny them their confi-
dence. 
 
All such motions of confidence were regulated by article 64: 
 
The Cortes can decide a vote of censure against the government or one of its 
ministers. Every vote of censure has to be proposed and seconded, and pre-
sented in writing, with the signatures of 50 serving deputies… The proposal 
may not be debated or any vote called until five days after its presentation. 
The government or the minister will not be obliged to resign where a vote of 
censure does not receive the approval of an absolute majority of all elected 
deputies (i.e. to pass, a motion of censure required 234 votes). 
 
The Constitution created a semi-presidential system in which the President was free to appoint 
and dismiss Prime Ministers without any need for parliamentary approval. The government re-
mained in office unless defeated in a vote of no-confidence, which required an absolute majority. 
The system was one of dual confidence: no government could be formed against the wishes of the 
President, and none could stay in power against the wishes of a parliamentary majority. The 
President himself had only limited powers to dissolve parliament. 
 
There were only three censure motions called during the Second Republic – two of which were 
defeated in the vote. The third, a dubious ‘no confidence motion,’ did manage to unseat a gov-
ernment. Only two of the governments that were formally presented to parliament received par-
liamentary assent without a vote being taken; nine presented themselves and received a vote of 
confidence, while one presented itself only to fail a motion of confidence, forcing its resignation. 
Five governments did not formally present themselves, one of which received an indirect vote of 
confidence, while two did not present themselves because Cortes had been dissolved. Given this, 
it is clear that we can neither speak of the Second Republic as a purely parliamentary regime, and 
nor can it be described as a strictly presidential one, even although it made the creation of two 
presidential governments possible. 
 
The presidential government that was formed in 30 December 1935, while the Cortes was sus-
pended, consisted of a Prime Minister and five ministers who were not deputies, and a further 
four ministers who represented minor parties. When this government was called to appear before 
the Cortes’s Permanent Council (Diputación Permanente), at the request of CEDA, it decided to 
dissolve parliament and call early elections to be held on 16 February 1936. 
 
These are fundamental differences between the republican period in Portugal 1910-26 and in the 
Spanish Republic 1931-36. One is that Portugal did not expand suffrage – includeing women’s 
suffrage – the way Spain did, and equally if not more significant the presence in Portuguese 
cabinets – including premiers and civilian ministers – of military officers and their absence in the 
Spanish cabinets in those positions. 
 
The cabinet could not control parliament since the President was only allowed to instigate two 
dissolutions during each mandate. For this reason, the executive was overly dependent on a cham-
ber that obtained political superiority while it was drafting the constitution. Nevertheless, 
government instability, with nineteen cabinets in only five years, was more the result of the party 
system than a reflection of executive weakness in relation to parliament. The party system during 
the Second Republic was highly fragmented, particularly in the constituent assembly where sev-
eral small regional, personalist and ideological Republican factions had sprung up during the   16
brief period of increased liberalization after the fall of the dictatorship and the monarchy. The 
new regime was among the most significant examples of an open competitive structure, in which 
coalition governments were the rule. This meant that changes in government were commonplace 
between and within legislatures, as the parties of each different coalition were constantly chang-
ing in their search for a stability that was never achieved; consequently many of the coalition 
governments incorporated a large number of different political parties: for example, during the 
second legislature, which lasted from November 1933 to February 1936, there were ten different 
governments, each of which included at least four different parties, and almost all of which in-
corporated and excluded major parties (Table 3). 
 
Some time had to pass from the domination of the Left in 1931 before the Right could create a 
new mass party: CEDA (Confederación  Española de Derechas Autónomas). This new party 
could, perhaps, be labelled conservative Demo-Christian; in addition, the old dynastic and ideo-
logical divisions between the Carlists, Alfonsists and the regionalist right (especially the Lliga) 
persisted. The Radicals, who, given their traditions and their electoral strength, had the potential 
to emerge as a large and powerful party of the center, had to face both the competition from, and 
the attraction of the bourgeois anticlerical left. This was particularly true following the 1933 elec-
tions, when they could only govern with support from CEDA. When faced with socioeconomic 
issues, such as agrarian reform and collaboration with the Socialists, also split the bourgeois 
center-left. 
 
The 1933 elections produced a conservative-center majority that could, theoretically at least, have 
sustained governments until September 1937. In fact, however, it produced a number of unstable 
governments: a stalemate that led to two presidential cabinets during which parliament was 
suspended. It was the second of these presidential governments that called early elections, which 
were held in February 1936. It is not easy to explain the developments that occurred during these 
so-called bienio negro. One suggestion is that CEDA’s perceived ‘semi-loyalty’ to the regime – 
an assessment that is grounded in the party’s commitment to reform what it believed to be a 
partisan constitution, while its opponents identified the constitution with the regime itself – and, 
following CEDA’s entry into government, used this to justify the revolution of October 1934. 
The October 1934 revolution was also the first manifestation of the left’s ‘semi-’ or ‘dis-’ loyalty 
toward bourgeois democracy. Another factor was the role of the presidential veto preventing 
CEDA’s access to executive power, its destabilization of some of the Radical governments, and 
its ultimately futile hopes of creating a new political center, something unlikely to be successful 
with an electoral law that favored polarized coalitions. All of these factors combined with the 
fractionalization of the party system at the center to create a Sartorian type of polarized pluralism. 
 
The two major mass parties of the 1930s – PSOE and CEDA – were underrepresented in gov-
ernment considering their parliamentary strength, their share of the electorate, and the extent of 
their support within organized institutional groups, such as the UGT and the Church. Both parties, 
and PSOE after 1933 in particular, were internally divided between those who wished to operate 
legally within a reformed system, and the ‘maximalists’ who no longer believed that the system 
deserved their loyalty, and who were eager to collaborate with the disloyal opposition: PSOE 
with the Communists, and CEDA with Calvo Sotelo’s monarchists. Their ambivalence, whether 
latent or open, made it difficult for these parties to aspire towards a share of government 
responsibility; in fact, accepting such responsibilities in the spring of 1936 would almost certainly 
have caused a split within PSOE. Their ambivalence towards the system also made potential 
partners mistrustful and reluctant to form coalitions with either of these parties. In the case of 
CEDA, the other parties prolonged the presidential veto that prevented it from entering govern-
ment and increasing its political influence. This is the main reason why most Second Republic 
governments were formed by the main center-left and center-right parties, the Izquierda Repub-  17
licana and the Radicals; either in coalition with smaller partner parties or independents, or, in the 
case of Portela’s cabinet of 1935-36, by forming minority governments that incorporated people 
who were not members of parliament. 
 
PSOE’s only government experience was gained in the first four cabinets of the Republic; 881 
days out of a possible 1,920. Just three of the nineteen ministers in office during this time were 
PSOE members, although they did occupy some of the more important ministerial portfolios: 
Labor, Justice, Finance and Public Works. Despite being the second largest group in parliament, 
387 days passed from the opening of the legislature before CEDA was given ministerial repre-
sentation: a move that immediately provoked the Asturias Revolution of October 1934, a general 
strike, and the declaration of ‘independence’ by the Catalan regional authorities. CEDA’s in-
volvement in cabinet lasted 436 days, and was limited to seven ministers at a time when there 
were a total of nineteen individuals appointed to cabinet position. Nevertheless, CEDA’s influ-
ence within government, and the political system in general, was much greater than the number of 
portfolios its supporters obtained. That said, however, for almost one-third of the Second Repub-
lic, neither CEDA nor PSOE were represented at cabinet level, and, combined, only provided ten 
of the eighty-nine individuals who occupied the 238 ministerial positions that were created. These 
facts must be taken into account when looking at the subsequent tables as they indicate the 
existence of a considerable separation between the real social and the formal political power, and 
between the political and parliamentary leaderships and official government positions. 
 
The constraints imposed on the formation of coalitions, and the presence of both disloyal and 
‘semi-loyal’ oppositions, support by abstention and not by votes of confidence, and the reluctance 
to call on the support of certain parties, led to the formation of governments in which even the 
larger center-left and center-right parties had to include individuals from minor parties. Azaña’s 
Acción Republicana (Republican Action – later renamed Izquierda Republicana) could count on 
the support of the Catalan Esquerra (Catalan Left) – which controlled the regional government in 
Barcelona – and the Galician regional party, ORGA, to construct stable coalitions. The Basques’ 
strong opposition to the regime’s early anticlericalism, and their suspicion of the right’s Castilian 
centralism prevented their main party, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV – Basque National 
Party), from providing a single member to any pre-Civil War cabinet. The Radical Party, led by 
Lerroux and his successors, faced a difficult task in late 1935 when they were called to construct 
a coalition. Lerroux’s break with Azaña, in whose first cabinet he had participated, and his desire 
the incorporate the Catholic masses who had been alienated from the Republic made coalitions 
with center-left Republicans impossible.  
 
The Radicals’ only potential partners were either small personalist factions, or were, in the case 
of CEDA, too far to the right for some of its followers. This resulted in a period of considerable 
political instability both prior to and following the 1933 elections, when twenty-five new minis-
ters entered cabinet in just 387 days (compared with a total of nineteen during the previous 881 
days). The Radicals’ coalition with CEDA – which was always an uneasy alliance – was as dis-
tasteful to an ideologically Catholic party as the earlier alliance of Acción Republicana with the 
Socialists had been to many bourgeois left-republicans. This effectively forced the Radicals to 
seek alliances among minor parties like the Agrarians, the Catalan Lliga and leading independ-
ents; these groups often exacted a heavy price for their support. Under these circumstances, the 
President attempted to exert his influence over the cabinet formation process. 
 
PSOE’s refusal to enter government following its participation in the victorious Popular Front 
electoral coalition of February 1936 forced Azaña and his successor, Casares Quiroga, to govern 
in a minority coalition that included the Esquerra and the more moderate Unión Republicana 
(Republican Union). The added parliamentary representation of Izquierda Republicana (eighty-  18
seven deputies), Esquerra (thirty-six) and Union Republicana (thirty-nine) give the coalition a 
total of 162 votes from a total of 474. This coalition government was confronted with the series 
of crises that culminated in the Civil War.  
 
If we consider PSOE, Acción Republicana in 1931 (on account of Azaña’s leadership), Izquierda 
Republicana in 1936, the Esquerra (because of its regional dominance), the Radical-Socialists in 
1931 (because of their parliamentary strength), the Radicals and CEDA as the major parties of the 
Second Republic, then we note that, between them, they only provided fifty-five ministers of 
ninety-three out of a total of 238 ministerial portfolios. 
 
Despite the political fragmentation, the proliferation of small parties of the center and the strength 
of the various regional parties, the separation between the left and the right was clear. Only four 
individuals served as ministers in the Republican-Socialist governments of the early Republic and 
in the Radical dominated governments of 1933-36 as well as the Popular Front cabinet of spring 
1936. One of this small number was Alejandro Lerroux, the old leader of the Radicals; another 
was one of his followers, Martínez Barrio, who responded by forming the Unión Republicana; 
the third was another member of the Radicals, who followed Martínez Barrio out of the party, 
while the fourth was a serving army general whose participation in cabinet was professional 
rather than political. Not one of the center parties was able, after the autumn of 1934, to establish 
their domination over the political coalition formation process (Allgemeinkoalitionsfähigkeit) in 
the way that the Radicals had in France during the Third and Fourth French Republics, or as some 
Christian Democratic parties have been able to do in postwar Europe. One of the reasons that may 
explain this failure is that, except in a few districts, the electoral system effectively forced the 
minor parties to enter into electoral coalitions.  
 
Another explanation is that the ideological nature of Second Republic politics, and the ambivalent 
attitude of many political leaders towards what they believed were only ‘semi-loyal’ to the 
Republican system: PSOE and CEDA. The two mass parties did not help matters by behaving in 
a manner that only served to confirm many of their opponents’ suspicions (Linz 1967b). Conflicts 
between the various political personalities made it even more difficult for some individuals to 
serve together in cabinets that reflected only small policy shifts, or that acted as bridges between 
the different phases of the Republic: it is for this reason that we can distinguish well-defined 
clusters of individuals serving within the various cabinets. 
 
That great symbol of democratic instability, Germany’s Weimar Republic, which, from its crea-
tion to the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor – up to and including the unstable presidential 
ministries of 1932-33 – had a total of 264 cabinet positions, either as ministers or as members of 
the Peoples’ Representative Council (Rat der Volksbeauftragten). A total of ninety-nine indi-
viduals occupied these 264 portfolios during the fourteen years of the Weimar Republic’s exis-
tence. In the five-year life of the Second Spanish Republic, from its creation on 14 April 1931 to 
the Nationalist insurrection of 18 July 1936 – a total of sixty-three months – eighty-nine individu-
als occupied 238 ministerial positions (seven of which were partial changes). On this basis alone, 
it would appear that the Spanish Republic was much more unstable than the Weimar Republic, 
upon which its constitution was modelled (Linz, 1967b; and our data). 
 
Significantly, during the crisis of 1936 – at a time when the parties were becoming increasingly 
polarized and their leaders displaying greater animosity towards one another – some of the more 
moderate politicians came to believe that ministries led by personalities and with emergency 
powers were the only way to overcome the difficulties. Later, as the army’s 17 July pronuncia-
miento threatened to drag the country towards Civil War, Martínez Barrio – the most centrist of 
the bourgeois left politicians – who had been charged by President Azaña to form a government, 
proposed a coalition cabinet that included General Mola, one of the leaders of the insurgency.   19
Almost certainly a last desperate attempt to defuse the situation, it was condemned to failure with 
Mola’s alleged response: ‘Ni usted ni yo podemos echarnos atrás’ (Neither you nor I can turn 
back the clock). Nevertheless, the fact that the attempt was made reflects the importance that all 
attributed towards the cabinet as the locus for political integration. 
 
From 1931 to 1936, none of the extremist movements: the anarcho-syndicalists (a mass ideologi-
cally driven trade union movement), the Communists, fascists, the traditionalist or authoritarian 
monarchists, participated in government. Their time was to come in the wake of the polarization 
that destroyed the regime and which had crystallized in the Civil War. It was then that the extrem-
ists entered the governments on each side of the conflict. 
 
There were a total of six cabinets led by four different Prime Ministers during the Civil War – 
including Martínez Barrio’s ephemeral twenty-four-hour cabinet. Most of the members of this 
short-lived ministry and its successor, which was led by Giral, and which survived until Septem-
ber 1936, were either left-republican deputies (three of whom had been deputies at the time of the 
Constitutional Monarchy), former ministers (one of whom was a member of Esquerra; another 
was an independent left-republican whose father had served as a minister during the last 
Regency). Only one portfolio in Martínez Barrio’s cabinet, that of War, was held by a serving of-
ficer in the armed forces; in Giral’s ministry, serving officers occupied both the Ministry of War 
and the Ministry of the Interior. The other two cabinets, which were led by the socialists, Largo 
Caballero (a veteran UGT leader) and Negrín, were larger coalitions that systematically excluded 
the military from within their ranks. These ministries incorporated two communists, then in early 
September, a representative from the Basque PNV. A few weeks later, and following the prece-
dent set by the Catalan Generalitat, four anarchist leaders were included. The entry of the Basque 
nationalist as a Minister without Portfolio was part of an agreement made by Largo Caballero that 
promised the immediate enactment of the Basque autonomy statute. Basque autonomy was 
approved in early October, at parliament’s first meeting following the outbreak of the Civil War – 
a meeting that was attended by approximately 100 deputies, most of whom represented Popular 
Front coalition parties.  
 
The exit of the CNT and UGT ministers during Negrín’s first cabinet came about in response to 
the refusal of the trade union organizations to collaborate with the government. In August 1938, 
the sole PNV minister, Irujo, resigned in protest at Negrín’s policy towards the Church and the 
repression of the Marxist POUM. The resultant reshuffle brought in another CNT leader and a 
new Basque nationalist to join Negrín’s final ministry; however, the former was accused of being 
a ‘negrinista,’ while the latter was a member of Acción Nacionalista Vasca (Basque Nationalist 
Action – ANV), and not the PNV. The number of manual workers occupying ministerial office 
was large in all of the Civil War governments, with the exception of Negrín’s second ministry 
(April 1937-April 1938). Largo Caballero’s second ministry included six manual workers – ex-
cluding the Prime Minister, who had been a professional politician since 1904 – the highest pro-
portion of any Spanish cabinet. Largo Caballero’s second ministry also included a woman, with 
the anarcho-syndicalist Federica Montseny occupying the Ministry for Health and Social Assis-
tance, becoming the first woman minister in any southern European country. 
 
As a consequence of the insurgents’ assault on the capital, both the government and parliament 
transferred to Valencia in early-November 1936. Parliament sat very rarely, and held its final ses-
sion in Figueras (near Gerona) when the war was almost over. In the meantime, right-wing depu-
ties had abandoned parliament, with a significant number of them either being arrested or shot 
during the first weeks of the Civil War. Considering the circumstances, and the fact that many of 
the wartime cabinets did not have the opportunity to obtain the support of the legislature, to talk 
of parliamentary – let alone democratic – government would be misleading. Interestingly, how-  20
ever, the large majority of Civil War Republican ministers were parliamentary deputies; the only 
significant exceptions being, if we exclude the few military ministers, during Largo Caballero’s 
second government, which included CNT ministers, and Negrín’s final government – which was 
the final Republican ministry – which incorporated five ministers who had never been elected to 
parliament. Apart from Hungary, the Civil War republican governments were the only European 
ones west of the Soviet border in which Communists held cabinet position, and the only ones ever 
to have included anarcho-syndicalist ministers. 
 
There are important facts that we must emphasize  in any comparison between governmental 
structures during the 1930s with either the Constitutional Monarchy or the Dictatorship. Firstly, 
and with the exception of Chapaprieta’s and Portela’s governments of late 1935, there was a sig-
nificant increase in the size of ministries from their original nine-eleven-man membership. This 
was particularly true of Lerroux’s first Radical governments, and of the Civil War cabinets, where 
the size of cabinet reached eighteen members, Prime Minister included. The actual size of cabinet 
had not altered from early 1860 until March 1918, when an additional ministry was incorporated, 
raising the total size of cabinet from nine to ten ministers (see table 2). Similarly, there were no 
significant alterations in portfolio titles during this period, apart from the introduction of 
Education during Silvela’s second ministry in 1900. (The number of portfolios remained at nine 
since, with the loss of the Philippines and its last colonies in America, the Overseas Ministry was 
abolished). The introduction of Ministers without Portfolio, which first appeared during the 
Radical-CEDA coalition government of October 1934, became increasingly common – particu-
larly during the Civil War when its use was dictated by the necessity to construct stable coa-
litions.  
 
The Republic introduced a number of new ministerial portfolios: Communications (which had a 
precedent in the Provisional Government); Health, which was created in September 1935, and 
was closely related to the Ministry of Labor; Propaganda, created during Largo Caballero’s sec-
ond government; and the expansion of the Navy Ministry to include Air (to become the Naval 
and Air Ministry) during the Civil War. Nevertheless, this tendency to create new ministries was 
not novel; it had been practiced during the 1920s when equally important ministries were estab-
lished, such as the Ministry of Labor in 1920, and the National Economy Ministry that was cre-
ated at the end of the Dictatorship – not to mention the expansion of the Labor ministry to include 
Social Security (Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión). Primo de Rivera introduced another systemic 
innovation with the creation of the office of Vice President (Depute Prime Minister) in 1925, and 
while this disappeared with his fall from power, it was to be revived temporarily in 1933-34 and 
1938-39 (during Lerroux’s second government and Franco’s first government, respectively), and 
permanently in July 1962. 
 
While the Republic may have awoken the hopes of the Spanish people, the outcome of the Civil 
War meant the destruction of Spain’s democracy, and the installation of Western Europe’s second 
most durable dictatorship, after neighboring Portugal (Linz 1978).  
 
Franco’s regime, like the one it displaced, represented almost complete ministerial discontinuity 
from that which had preceded it (Tables 1 and 3). Only Primo’s Civil Directory, in which all 
ministers were novices to that position, had a greater level of ministerial discontinuity (100 per-
cent). Not one of Franco’s ministers had served at that rank during the Second Republic: the only 
two with previous ministerial experience, General Martínez Anido and Eduardo Aunós, had both 
served under Primo de Rivera. (This situation is altered slightly if we consider the parliamentary 
experience of Franco’s ministers, where a total of eleven had been deputies: six during the Re-
public; two during the Constitutional Monarchy; with a further three having served in both – rep-
resenting approximately 9 percent of Franco’s ministers. However, it should be noted that two of   21
these former deputies were military officers, while a third, Serrano Suñer, was Franco’s brother-
in-law.) Moreover, with the exception of Serrano Suñer, not one of this small number of Franco’s 
ministers was appointed a second time. Aware of Primo de Rivera’s lack of success in obtaining 
the support of Restoration politicians by rewarding them with ministerial office, Franco was to 
make no special effort to restore specialist politicians from the past, either to occupy second level 
administrative positions (Jerez, 1982), or to sit in his largely self-appointed Corporatist Chamber. 
Only 8.4 percent of the Asamblea Consultiva’s (Consultative Assembly) 359 members, and 3.1 
percent of the 992 individuals elected to one of the Republic’s three parliaments sat in Franco’s 
non-democratic Cortes, which had more than 550 members in each of its ten legislatures – and 
most of these had been members of the 1933 parliament (Linz 1972 and 1979).  
 
One of the defining characteristics of Franco’s regime as an authoritarian regime – without deny-
ing the existence of totalitarian tendencies within it – was its ‘limited pluralism’ (Linz, 1964 and 
2001). It was a pluralism that included not only those social forces that occupied the conservative 
side of the political spectrum, i.e. the professional officer corps, the Church, and certain economic 
interests: it also incorporated people from a range of political backgrounds who had several 
different aspirations. The concept of society, its institutional goals and social linkages that were 
expressed by the Falangists, the Traditionalists, the authoritarian Catholics in both the Asociación 
Católica Nacional de Propagandistas (Catholic National Association of Propagandists – 
ANCdeP) and Opus Dei, and the Monarchists, were quite different, often conflicting, and had 
their roots in society before the regime. Such diversity was not incompatible with loyalty to the 
Caudillo and was used by him as he consolidated and maintained himself in power. 
 
The regime’s ‘limited pluralism’ meant that people connected to and supported by different 
groups entered into a sort of ‘coalition government’ whose members were chosen by Franco. 
These members were not chosen to represent their supporters, and they all had to swear their un-
dying loyalty to the Caudillo. The main aim of the large negative coalition that supported the Al-
zamiento (uprising) was to put an end to democracy in Spain: the overthrow of a system that had 
allowed the introduction of policies that were a direct threat, or, at the very least, which were in 
opposition to their interests. These policies were varied, and extended to education, church-state 
relations, army reform, political decentralization, labor laws, agrarian reform, etc.  
 
While Italian Fascism provided more inspiration to the Franco regime than Salazarism (Costa Pinto 
2002: 437 ff.), the political strength of Franco’s regime lay with the army and the Catholic Church – 
to a much greater extent that in either Italy or Nazi Germany, where the army was clearly subordinate 
to the regime party. Franco created an institutional system that included bodies such as the Junta 
Política (Political Committee) and the Consejo Nacional de FET-JONS (FET-JONS National Coun-
cil) – the official name for the party that had been created by Franco out of the fusion of José Antonio 
Primo de Rivera’s small fascist party, Falange Española (Spanish Phalanx – the Falange) and Comu-
nión Tradicionalista –, the corporatist Cortes and the Council of the Realm.  
 
The fifty-member National Council was appointed by Franco in October 1937 to represent the 
new political factions; three of its members were women. Thirteen members of this body were to 
go on to attain ministerial rank: three Falangists out of its eighteen members, including the Falan-
gist sympathizer, General Yagüe; two Traditionalists from eleven; one Monarchist from five; one 
former CEDA deputy, Serrano Suñer; four military officers from eight (including Yagüe); and 
two others from the remaining five who did not fall into any of these categories. 
 
Although FET-JONS had become a largely empty bureaucratic apparatus by the 1940s, many of 
its ancillary organizations (particularly the vertical unions) were to continue playing an important 
role until the end of the regime. All of these institutional bodies were created through a series of 
‘Fundamental Laws,’ which the regime used in its attempt to institutionalize itself as a represen-  22
tational system different from the pluralist Western democracies without, however, making the 
regime’s official single-party the dominant power center within the system. Corporatist ideologies 
would serve Franco and his supports as they created the political institutions they hoped would 
continue after Franco’s death. As is usual in authoritarian regimes, none of the legal texts 
recognized the separation of political power between the legislature, executive and the judiciary: 
sovereignty neither rested within, nor was it shared with the legislature (Linz 1979).  
 
According to Article 22 of the Ley Orgánica del Estado (State Organic Law): ‘The institutional 
system of the Spanish state is based on the principles of unity of power and co-ordination of func-
tions,’ while Article 6 states that: ‘The head of state is the supreme representative of the nation, 
personifies national sovereignty, exercises supreme political and administrative power, is vested 
with the national leadership of the Movement… [and] Guarantees and insures the regular func-
tioning of the senior organs of the state and the proper coordination between such organs.’ 
 
The Regime’s cabinet, which Franco presided over every week – even when he was on holiday – 
was the real center of power in a manner that was in stark contrast to the situation in other dicta-
torships, such as the Soviet Union (where the Communist Politburo was the supreme body), Fas-
cist Italy (where the Fascist Grand Council functioned in parallel with the cabinet), and Nazi Ger-
many (where Hitler made unilateral decisions). Furthermore, when ministers enjoyed Franco’s 
confidence, they were often allowed to exercise a considerable degree of autonomy in their areas 
of competence, although this was perhaps less true in certain strategic ministries, such as Defense 
and Foreign Affairs, etc. To be a minister under Franco meant that one had reached the apex of 
power: FET-JONS’s Political Committee was never a threat, and for years was moribund. 
Frequent cabinet reshuffles were Franco’s main means of implementing policy changes. Through 
them, the Caudillo altered the regime’s internal balance of power by weakening one of the its 
‘political families,’ while strengthening another. The single party was itself represented by the 
Minister-Secretary of FET-JONS (later renamed the Movimiento) who discussed party affairs 
either within cabinet or directly with Franco. 
 
Franco’s first regular cabinet was formed at the beginning of 1938 to substitute the administra-
tively weak civilian Junta Técnica del Estado (State Technical Committee) that had been created 
in October 1936.
21 Serrano Suñer, who displaced Nicolás Franco as Secretary of the Executive 
and accumulated the Interior Ministry, played a decisive role both in creating this ministry and in 
shaping its political orientation in the direction of Mussolini and Italian Fascism. As was true of 
all of Franco’s governments, this first ministry was a coalition of many – but not all – of the 
forces supporting the Nationalist cause; nevertheless, not all of Spain’s many rightist tendencies 
were involved, and those that were, did not necessarily obtain representation proportional to their 
electoral strength during the Republic (Tusell 1992). 
 
The distribution of portfolios established a pattern that was to be repeated throughout the dicta-
torship’s existence, without it actually becoming a rule: the Falange occupied the ‘social’ minis-
tries: Agriculture and Syndical Organization; the Traditionalists received the Ministry of Justice 
(which was responsible for the regime’s relations with the Church); two of the more technical 
portfolios – Budget and Public Works – went to the moderate Monarchists who had been radicali-
zed into extreme right-wing positions during the Republic; the third technical ministry – Industry 
and Commerce – was occupied by a Naval Lieutenant Colonel of engineering who had was born 
and raised in the Galician naval town of El Ferrol at roughly the same time as Franco. The 
Interior Ministry, which was divided into two separate portfolios in an experiment that was not 
repeated, was shared between Franco’s Falangist and ex-CEDA deputy brother-in-law, Serrano 
Suñer, and Martínez Anido, who died during the war without being replaced as Minister of Public 
Order (Viver 1978; Jerez 1982; Baena del Alcázar 1999). 
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Of all the military officers called to political office by Franco, Martínez Anido, Gómez Jordana 
(Vice-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs), and Dávila (Minister of National Defense) were 
the only ‘old generation’ generals he was to ever choose. The military, however, continued to 
occupy important portfolios, even after Franco’s death and the end of his regime: these included 
the Ministries of the Interior (1941-73 and 1979-80) and those linked to the area of Defense 
(1939-79) as well as the office of Prime Minister until Carrero Blanco’s death in 1973. Moreover, 
military figures were frequent incumbents of the more technical ministries, at least until the mid-
1960s. Additionally, General Muñoz Grandes occupied the new position of Minister Secretary 
General of FET-JONS in the first government after the Civil War. 
 
The contentious Education portfolio was initially awarded to an extreme right-wing monarchist 
who was not particularly favorable towards the Church, although it soon passed to another mon-
archist with clear pro-Church sympathies, and who remained in office throughout the 1940s. This 
first Franco ministry had a short life: during the regime, only Carrero Blanco’s 1973 government 
had a briefer existence. 
 
Following the end of the Civil War, the new regime issued a decree in August 1939 that reor-
ganized the state’s central administration. The more important changes introduced by this law 
were: 
 
A) The abolition of the office of Vice Prime Minister, although this was compensated for 
by the creation of the Subsecretaría de la Presidencia (Prime Minister’s Under-secretary), which 
was granted ministerial rank in 1945. 
B) The Ministry of Defense was divided into three separate portfolios; one for each 
branch of the armed forces, Tierra (Army), Marina (Navy), and Aire (Air Force). According to 
some interpretations this was done to increase the number of political appointments which could 
be used to reward the loyalty of their comrades-in-arms, as well as to reduce any potential oppo-
sition from senior ranking officers. 
     C) The Secretary General of the party was elevated to the rank of Minister. This portfolio 
was vacant twice: for fourteen months from March 1940 to May 1941, and for a much longer 
period at the end of the Second World War (until late 1948). Three months before disappearing 
with the return to democracy, a law of 1 April 1977 renamed it the Ministro Secretario del Go-
bierno. This law reorganized the organs dependent on the National Council and established a new 
juridical order for its associations, officers and resources (Román 1997: 49-50). 
  D) Responsibility for labor relations was divided between the old Ministry of Labor and 
the Delegación Nacional de Sindicatos, originally dependent on the General Secretariat of FET-
JONS, and whose National Delegate was elevated to cabinet rank in 1969. While other ministries 
were to be added during the 1950s, the basic structure of the cabinet remained unchanged, albeit 
with three important exceptions. The first of these was the reintroduction of the office of Vice 
Prime Minister, the incumbent of which was a military officer until 1973. The second change 
separated the position of Prime Minister from that of Head of State, with Carrero Blanco being 
appointed to the former. Thirdly, in 1969 the leader of the official state syndicates (trade unions) 
was appointed to cabinet as a Minister without Portfolio. 
 
There is no real agreement concerning the actual number of cabinets there were during the Franco 
Regime.
22 Some authors contend that there was only ever one ministry with occasional changes of 
individual personnel until 1973, when Carrero Blanco was appointed Prime Minister. However, 
we believe that there were a total of eleven distinct ministries: the short Civil War ministry; the 
Gobierno de la Victoria (Victory Government); the September 1942 cabinet that was appointed in 
response to clashes between Falangists and Carlists as well as in consequence of developments 
taking place in the Second World War, which included three important appointments, including   24
the pro-Allied Conde de Jordana who replaced the pro-Axis Serrano Suñer at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs; the July 1945 cabinet, which was a reaction to the Allied victory, and which saw 
the exit of all those who could be perceived as obstacles to Spain’s approaches towards the 
victors, including the General Secretary of FET-JONS. Alberto Martín Artajo, formerly the Gen-
eral Secretary of Catholic Action, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs – a position he 
retained until 1957, in the hope that he could act as a bridge between the regime and the Christian 
Democratic forces that were coming into ascendancy throughout liberated Europe (Linz, 1970; 
Tusell, 1984); with the exception of the 1962 government which lasted for three years, there were 
a total of five ministries between 1951 and 1973, each changing at five or six year intervals; 
Carrero Blanco’s 1973 ministry; and Arias’s government that ended with Franco’s death in 
November 1975. 
 
While the Organic Law established a five-year mandate for Prime Ministers, with the exception 
of Franco himself, no Prime Minister appointed after 1967 (the year the relevant law came into 
force) survived for more than three years: Carrero Blanco was assassinated, and after the death of 
the Caudillo, Arias offered his resignation to the King and was asked to continue as PS of a new 
cabinet. 
 
During the course of forty years, a total of 120 individuals (including Franco) held at least one 
ministerial portfolio. The main factor in explaining any individual’s selection for ministerial of-
fice – and indeed the criteria for attaining any senior political position under Franco – was the 
individual’s membership of at least one of the Movement’s ‘political families.’ However, while 
this may be the main factor, it is not the only one: examples where independents from a sympa-
thetic group participated as ministers were not infrequent, and links to more than one group or 
‘political family’ usually facilitated a political career. The only a priori condition was absolute 
loyalty to General Franco, with even the slightest suspicion of anything less leading to immediate 
dismissal. Many of the other factors leading to ministerial positions being offered to individuals 
during the Franco regime are common to most political regimes: family ties; wealth; friendship; 
and membership of certain bureaucratic bodies – in other words, being well-connected. Certainly, 
in an extremely personalist regime, and in a country in which cliques and power clans prolifer-
ated, the ‘best connected’ – in terms of political usefulness – were the ones retained by Franco 
and other influential leaders around him.  
 
In reality, however, it was Franco who established the ground rules when, in October 1936, he 
appointed his brother Nicolás as Secretary of the State Technical Council, and when, one year 
later, he gave Serrano Suñer a large degree of autonomy in the formation of his new regime’s first 
government, allowing him to occupy the Interior Ministry and remain as Cabinet Secretary 
(Tusell 1992). He also tended to promote his comrades in arms from El Ferrol, his own birth-
place, and those military leaders whose seniority was similar to his. Nevertheless, this in no way 
minimizes the fact that Franco was willing to reward personal competence and professional abil-
ity, particularly during the second half of his regime, in his choice of cabinet ministers (Jerez 
1982; 1996). 
 
Leaving aside military and ideological factors, one of the main considerations adopted for ap-
pointing someone to Franco’s cabinet was his increasing use of, to use Parsonion terminology, 
‘adscriptive achievement.’ Irrespective of an individual’s social background, a brilliant academic 
record and success in the competitive examinations of any of the administration’s leading profes-
sional bodies - State Advocate (abogado del Estado), or a lawyer of the State Council (letrado del 
Consejo de Estado), for example – represented an ‘adscriptive’ mark. Often the accumulation of 
such achievements, including being a university professor or a member of one of the elite en-
gineering professional bodies was even more important than any nepotistic ties. Naturally, if   25
these individuals had also had some form of relationship with either the Falange, the Catholic or-
ganizations – such as the ACNdeP – and later Opus Dei, or if they had entered the military judi-
cial service, then this was counted as a bonus. 
 
Within the government, the Secretary General of the regime’s party occupied a special position. 
The Secretary General represented the integration of the single party into the state and its govern-
ment, which through its various organizations (Press and Propaganda, the Women’s Section, the 
Youth movement, the Spanish University Union, etc.), and, for some time within the public ad-
ministration, increased its standing in the state’s estimation. With the advent of democracy, many 
of these activities were transferred to different ministries. There existed a certain dualism between 
the party’s General Secretary and the Interior Ministry, which incorporated a political factor – 
largely dominated by the large contingent of Falangists – in respect of nominating representatives 
at the provincial and local levels. Apart from during the early years of the regime, none of FET-
JONS’s General Secretaries obtained the power enjoyed by their Italian Fascist counterparts. 
 
All of the ministers occupying the three military portfolios – Army, Navy and Air Force – were 
professional military officers. During the Constitutional Monarchy, the Ministries of War and of 
the Navy were often given to civilians, while that was the general rule during the Second Repub-
lic, prominent civilian leaders, such as Azaña, Martínez Barrio, Lerroux, Gil Robles and Casares 
Quiroga, occupied the Minister of War. Even during the Republican Civil War cabinets, military 
officers occupied the Ministry of War only during the first two governments, being replaced by 
civilians for the remainder of the war, while the Navy portfolio – later Navy and Air – was held 
by civilians all the time. In addition to their monopoly of the military portfolios, military officers 
during the Franco regime were also appointed to other senior cabinet positions. For example, Ad-
miral Carrero Blanco was Under-secretary to the Prime Minister (ministro subsecretario de la 
Presidencia) before being appointed Vice-president then Prime Minister President of Govern-
ment, while Generals Gómez Jordana and Beigbeder were both Ministers of Foreign Affairs dur-
ing the first years of the regime, and Navy Engineer Suances twice Minister of Industry and Com-
merce (1938-39 and 1945-51). Similarly, for many years, members of the army’s legal services – 
men who also had other careers – held a number of important ministries, including Interior and 
General Secretary of FET-JONS (Table 4). 
 
Franco’s advancing years and his physical decline, which became apparent at the beginning of the 
1970s, contributed greatly to the appearance of a large number of regime supporters who under-
stood that it would be impossible for them to maintain the same level of political control fol-
lowing his death. In the meanwhile, the regime’s fragility had remained obvious during the break-
down between the notable economic development of the 1960s and the lack of any political 
development. This imbalance, a reflection of the regime’s crisis, generated a feeling of precari-
ousness during the regime’s final years, which were marked by judicial processes that had im-
portant international and domestic repercussions. For example, the ‘Burgos Trial’ of 1970, in 
which a military tribunal handed down nine death sentences (which were commuted by Franco, 
who came under very strong pressure to do so) and a total of 513 years imprisonment for defen-
dants who had been charged with terrorism; in 1973, nine leaders of the illegal trade union 
movement, Comisiones Obrereras (Workers’ Commissions – CCOO), were sentenced to a total 
of 150 years imprisonment at the ‘Trial 1001’ (Carr and Fusi 1981: 146, 156). The regime’s feel-
ings of fragility were reinforced towards the end of 1973, when ETA assassinated Franco’s 
recently appointed Prime Minister, Carrero Blanco. 
 
With the death of Franco on 20 November 1975, and Juan Carlos I’s ascension to the Spanish 
throne, Carlos Arias Navarro became the Prime Minister of a government that included some 
reformers who favored a slow and controlled transition towards democracy. Arias Navarro’s   26
failure led to the King replacing him with Adolfo Suárez on 7 July 1976. Suárez had been a 
member of Arias Navarro’s government, and was made Prime Minister in accordance with the 
constitution that Franco himself had approved. His government’s immediate task, one that Suárez 
had assumed on accepting his appointment as Prime Minister,
23 was to push ahead with the tran-
sition to democracy with the enacting of the Law for Political Reform in late 1976. This law pro-
vided for a constituent election to take place on 15 June 1977: the first competitive elections in 
Spain in forty years.
 24 
 
Suárez’s own new party, the Unión de Centro Democrático (Union of the Democratic Center – 
UCD), won a majority in these elections, and on 4 July 1977 he presided over the drafting of a 
new constitution and the organization of the March 1979 general elections, which his party also 
won. Following the municipal elections of 5 April 1979, Suárez formed his second government 
(which was the first constitutional democratic government since the Second Republic), and re-
mained Prime Minister until his resignation in February 1981. 
 
The new democratic constitution defined Spain as a Parliamentary Monarchy, making Spain the 
only kingdom in southern Europe. This document also granted autonomy status to three of 
Spain’s historic nations: Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, while allowing the rest of the 
country’s regions, and even some of its provinces, to seek autonomy within the state. Since 1983, 
a total of seventeen Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Communities – CCAA) have been 
created, including Andalucia, Valencia and the Canary Islands, each with its own separate 
government. The accumulation of substantial administrative powers by the several CCAAs has 
had a serious impact on the nature and definition of government in present-day Spain. These ef-
fects can best be illustrated by examining the configuration of democratic Spain’s pluralist party 
system. 
 
Since 1977, there have been a total of eight elections to the bicameral Cortes, and many more for 
the country’s seventeen autonomous parliaments. The elections have been held in conditions of 
complete normality, and in many cases have been largely unexciting. Politically, the elections 
have played a vital role in the consolidation of Spain’s democracy, as they have encouraged inter-
party competition and marked a definitive break with the country’s history of discontinuity, 
electoral fraud and political polarization, thus guaranteeing Spain’s admission in the select club 
of countries with stable and efficient democratic systems. 
 
Spanish elections are also significant at the theoretical level. The establishment of Spain’s new 
democracy places it among those countries with a history of discontinuous democratic party poli-
tics. Although there are some elements of continuity with the past, they have remained weak – not 
surprisingly so, given that the Republic fell in 1939 and Franco died in 1975, thereby surviving 
much longer than Mussolini, Salazar or Hitler. This also means that, as in the Greek and Por-
tuguese cases, the return to party politics took place in a different historical context than that 
existing in Western Europe after the Second World War – Italy included – with the result that the 
Spanish parties and their patterns of interaction may be considered to be distinctively new. A 
feature that makes Spain quite unique in Western Europe is the fact that we must analyze party 
systems, rather than simply a party system. This situation reflects both the relevance of peripheral 
nationalisms and the series of major electoral changes that have marked both the transition to, and 
the consolidation of democracy.  
 
Spain is a multinational, multicultural, and asymmetrical federal state (although there is some de-
bate about this) in which the state party system coexists alongside a variety of regional party sys-
tems. In each of these, a particular nationalist or regionalist party (or parties) plays a decisive 
role; regional cleavages have a different impact on electoral behavior, and different pattern of 
competition operate in both the Cortes and the regional parliaments. Moreover, over the last   27
twenty years, major changes have taken place in both the format and the mechanisms of party 
competition at the national level, which allows us to distinguish three periods, each of which is 
characterized by distinct party systems or at least by different party formats. A fundamental 
change occurred in 1982 with the disappearance of the UCD, the party that had won majorities in 
the 1977 and 1979 elections, and which had played a crucial role in the successful return to de-
mocracy. The resulting electoral realignment produced a change from a moderate multi-party 
system to one that seemed likely to develop into a predominant party system, led by PSOE. After 
a decade of Socialist dominance, there has been a return to the ‘moderate multiparty system’ at 
state level during the 1990s. The disappearance of the UCD, the changes of the identity of leading 
parties, and the series of distinct party formats are probably unique in the context of democratic 
politics in any European country (Linz and Montero 1999). 
 
From the beginning of the Second Restoration in the autumn of 1975 until the summer of 2002, 
Spain has had eleven different cabinets, the most recent of which was appointed in July 2002 by 
José María Aznar. The first two (Arias II and Suárez I) were non-democratic, and non-party gov-
ernments. The rest were all democratic one-party cabinets: Suárez II and III (UCD); Calvo Sotelo 
(UCD); González I to IV (PSOE); and Aznar I and II (PP). However, it could be argued that both 
the last González, and the first Aznar cabinets were de facto coalition governments since they 
were supported by stable agreements with peripheral nationalist forces, particularly by the Cata-
lan Convergència I Unió (Convergence and Union – CiU). In other words, these governments can 
formally be described as being minority cabinets, although not as substantive minority govern-
ment. With respect to the formation of these minority governments, it is important to note that 
this invariably has obviated the need to negotiate with the third state party, whether by the lead-
ership’s choice, or for reasons of ideological or leadership incompatibilities (for this latter, the 
case of González and the Izquierda Unida’s leader, Anguita, from 1986 to the late 1990s is in-
structive). 
 
The cabinets that emerged with the new democracy have the character of a true parliamentary 
government with similar features to those of other Western European parliamentary governments; 
however, as Bar said: ‘not surprisingly, a number of administrative features of the current Spanish 
government have been inherited from structures which pre-date the democratic monarchy, 
especially since the transition was smooth and orderly and did not cause any substantial break in 
the formal structure of the central public administration’ (1997, 116). Concerning its size, the 
number of ministers reached its peak during the second year of Suárez’s last government, with a 
total of twenty-six, including the Prime Minister. There were probably so many because of the 
need to satisfy different interests inside a party in which his leadership was being contested. In 
the PSOE government of 1982, the cabinet was reduced to seventeen, and has oscillated between 
fifteen (in the first Aznar cabinet) and nineteen ever since. The progressive devolution of powers 
to the Autonomous Communities – and the transfer of others to Brussels – has reduced the 
competence of many ministries, and can help explain the moderate size of more recent cabinets. 
The main structural difference between PSOE’s cabinets and those of the transition, the UCD and 
the PP, is basically that in the former there was just one Vice Prime Minister who had little 
connection to any particular area of government (although the first Vice Prime Minister had 
control over his party throughout his eight years in office), while the Vice Prime Ministers of the 
latter governments, with the exception of Suárez’s last ministry, held other ministerial portfolios. 
 
The form of government introduced by the new constitution is, like that of Germany, a rational-
ized parliamentary system in which the position of cabinet is formally preeminent and politically 
hegemonic, this preeminence being the result of both technical-constitutional and social-political 
factors. Antonio Bar’s summary of the status of, and the regulations governing, the Prime Minis-
ter and cabinet in the 1978 Constitution – particularly in his most recent work on the Spanish   28
cabinet – clearly demonstrates that Spain is now a parliamentary democracy in which the cabinet 
is, by and large, dominated by the Prime Minister (Bar 1985, 1997), while the executive is pro-
tected by a mechanism known as the ‘constructive vote of no confidence’ (Article 67 of Ger-
many’s Constitution), which protects it from parliament. These rules, combined with a moderate 
multiparty system and considerable party discipline, have insured the continued governmental 
stability that has been reflected in our data. 
 
During the first twenty-five years of Spain’s new democracy, cabinet stability, measured by the 
Prime Ministerial longevity has been greater than in any regime since 1833 (with the obvious ex-
ception of Franco), with a median duration of 34.7 months – 37.1 months if we consider only the 
cabinets appointed after the Constitution (Table 3). It should be emphasized that all but two of 
them served their complete terms. The two exceptions both occurred while the UCD had a parlia-
mentary majority: Suárez’s third government (the first government elected following the intro-
duction of the new constitution), which ended with his resignation in February 1981; and the suc-
ceeding government led by Calvo Sotelo, which lasted for twenty-two months. The only Prime 
Minister who has not yet exercised his authority to call an early election is the present incumbent, 
Aznar. The duration of the rest of the legislatures has ranged from thirty-three to forty-three 
months. Spain’s ‘reshuffle rate’ has been relatively high in comparison with other European 
countries during the post-Second World War period, however (Bar, 1997: 131). There was much 
less stability during the transitional period, given that Arias’s second ministry did not last seven 
months, while Suárez’s first ministry only survived for one year. 
 
There have been a total of 130 individual ministers holding 254 portfolios between July 1977 and 
July 2002: fifty-one during UCD parliaments, fifty-three under PSOE, and twenty-eight under the 
PP.
25 The transitional cabinets differ from those of neighboring Portugal insofar as that in Spain 
these cabinets did not result in the total displacement of the previous regime’s elites. This was 
largely as a result of the differing nature of each country’s transition: while in Spain the transition 
can best be described as being a ruptura pactada/reforma pactada (agreed break/agreed reform), 
Portugal’s transition was driven by a military coup. Consequently, there was an almost complete 
absence of a prominent military component (apart from the military portfolios during the earlier 
part of the process), and a greater willingness to incorporate left-wing opposition parties in 
Portugal. 
 
Only one former minister from the Franco regime,
26 and nine from the transition period cabinets 
were to occupy ministerial office following the June 1977 elections. All of the latter nine had 
served in Suárez’s first cabinet, while three of them, Calvo Sotelo, Martín Villa and Suárez him-
self, had been members of Arias’s first post-Franco ministry; none of these nine were to serve as 
ministers after 1982.
27 Of the thirty-three ministers of this ‘pre-democratic’ transitional period, 85 
percent were newcomers to ministerial rank, including the Parliamentary Monarchy’s first two 
Prime Ministers, and the first to hold the newly combined Ministry of Defense portfolio (which 
incorporated the former Ministries of the Army, of the Navy and of the Air Force). However, the 
overwhelming majority of the fifty-one UCD ministers had previously occupied second- or third-
level executive positions during the last years of Franco’s regime and the transition,
28 and almost 
one-third of them had been members of the corporatist Cortes – although this proportion declines 
to roughly one-quarter if those holding ministerial position only after Franco’s death are excluded 
(it should be borne in mind that according to the Ley de Cortes (Parliament Law) of 1942, all 
ministers appointed prior to the 1977 democratic election automatically obtained life membership 
– procuradores natos – of Franco’s Cortes) (Linz, 1979).  
 
It is apparent that, on the whole, the UCD ministers were not a group of political novices. This 
becomes even more clear when we look at those who were identified as azules (blues), as op-  29
posed to the other three ideological groups within this young and ephemeral party; i.e. the Chris-
tian democrats, the liberals, and the social democrats (Huneeus 1985; Hopkins 1999). Neverthe-
less, few of these individuals remained in active politics following the UCD’s defeat in the Octo-
ber 1982 elections, with only two of the fifty-one achieving ministerial position after this date: 
the social-democrat Fernández Ordoñez, who had occupied an important position during the last 
years of Franco’s regime, and who was included in González’s first cabinet; and the Christian 
democrat, Arias Salgado, who became a minister in Aznar’s first ministry. 
 
The arrival of PSOE to power in October 1982 marked a clear break, not only from Franco’s re-
gime, but also from the transition period. This break continued at the state level until 1996 with 
the election of the Partido Popular (Popular Party – PP) – now with a new generation of leaders 
who had emerged during the late-1980s. Continuities with the predemocratic period have per-
sisted within the local authorities, but in different proportions according to region; for example, 
32.7 percent of Galician mayors during the latter years of Franco’s regime, while only 14.7 per-
cent of Andalucian mayors – obtained either in 1973 by appointment of the civil governor and the 
Minister of Interior, or following the partial elections of January 1976 through a complex 
proceeding that was under the control of the Movimiento after the first democratic municipal 
elections of April 1979. Data for both regions show a declining tendency in these figures during 
the 1980s, but again at clearly different rates: 20.8 and 17.3 percent, in 1983 and 1989, respec-
tively, in Galicia where both conservative and clientelist tendencies were stronger (an over-
whelming majority of the Francoist mayors continuing during the new democracy were candi-
dates in the lists of the state-wide national parties of the right or center, in those of the moderate 
nationalists, or in those of independent electoral coalitions, rarely on the left); and 5.6 and 2.6 
percent for Andalucia where the left got much better results (Márquez 1992, 1993).  
 
In terms of personnel, there is also a high degree of discontinuity between the memberships of 
Franco’s parliaments and those of the Parliamentary Monarchy. Only 12.9 percent of parliamen-
tarians elected in June 1977 had also been procuradores under Franco, although this does not 
take into account the forty-one ‘royal’ senators – a designation that does not exist under the new 
constitution – sixteen of whom had been procuradores. The presence of former members of the 
Corporatist Chamber, not all of whom were necessarily Franco supporters,
29 declined substantial-
ly in the first democratic parliament (to 8.6 percent), before disappearing as a consequence of the 
collapse of the UCD and the right’s poor electoral performance up to 1993 (the proportion of 
former procuradores amongst the centrist parliamentary deputies was only four percent above the 
average, among the small parliamentary representation of Alianza Popular their number was 
about one-half of the group, while there was none amongst the socialist deputies).
30 As would be 
expected given the length of time that had passed in Spain before its transition to democracy com-
pared to both Italy and Germany, there are few examples of parliamentary careers that began 
during the Second Republic being resumed under the new democracy. In addition the presence of 
the former Republican deputies in the new chambers was largely symbolic since they did not play 
any significant role (Morán 1996). 
 
At the elite level, then, we can see that there was a clear breach with the past that was common 
within all parties at the state level, although it was less pronounced within both the UCD and the 
PCE (Spanish Communist Party), and relatively delayed within the PP. 
 
BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MINISTERIAL ELITE 
 
It is important to remember that the number of ministers is obviously greater for the more con-
tinuous and stable of the regimes we are examining here: i.e. the Constitutional Monarchy, the 
Franco Regime, and the post-1977 Parliamentary Monarchy, and for the shorter, unstable Second   30
Republic. The transitional regimes – the Dictablanda, the Civil War Republic and the post-
Franco transitional regime – were all relatively short, and offered fewer opportunities for minis-
terial appointment (although the numbers were often quite significant given their brevity). Con-
sequently, the percentages may be somewhat misleading. 
 
Age and gender distribution 
Age at the time of first ministerial appointment is in part a reflection of regime changes. The rise 
to power of extremist groups (like the fascists), which generally attract the young, contrasts with 
the more continuous cursus honorum that prevails in stable regimes. It is therefore no surprise 
that in the Constitutional Monarchy a large number of ministers were over fifty years of age, 
particularly during the second period under Alfonso XIII. As we will see in more detail below, 
these ministers had gone through process, which included a long period in parliament and other 
political offices before rising to cabinet rank. In the Primo’s Civil Directory there were a few 
younger ministers; however, our table, which combines the Civil Directory and the Berenguer 
and Aznar transition governments in which politicians of the traditional parties entered, shows the 
largest number of older ministers. We may be surprised to discover that the Second Republic, a 
new regime, should show a large number of older minister in addition to those in the thirty-to-
fifty age group. However, if we consider that many republican politicians had been in opposition 
to both the Constitutional Monarchy and the Dictatorship for many years, and that they came to 
power not by revolution, but as a result of the breakdown of the previous regimes, then we should 
not be too astonished. In fact, some of the younger ministers were neither Socialists nor 
Republicans, but those of the CEDA, whose leader was thirty-six years of age when he became a 
minister (Table 5).   31
 
Table 5: Age distribution, average age, and presence of women (%)
* 
  Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Civil  
Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
Second Republic  Franco 
Regime 
Transition to 
Democracy 
Parlia-
mentary 
Monarchy 
  I II     Civil 
War 
    
Average  age  53.0  55.3  53.2 51.1  46.9  51.0 51.0  44.7 
Age  group               
  Under 30 years  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.1  1.6  0.0  0.0 
  30-39  6.2  4.1  11.1  11.3  29.3  7.5  3.0  19.5 
  40-49  38.6  24.9  5.5  33.8  29.3  40.8  42.4  61.7 
  50-59  27.5  36.1  52.8  31.4  27.3  26.6  24.2  15.6 
  60 or over  27.5  33.1  30.6  20.2  7.6  23.3  30.3  3.1 
  Unknown  0.0  1.8  0.0  3.3  4.3  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Women -  -  -  -  2.2  0.0  0.0  10.0 
N  117  158  36  89 46 120  33  130 
* Age at time of the first appointment. Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. 
N=Number of individuals 
 
The governments of the Civil War Republic included the largest number of ministers under the 
age of forty, mainly members of the Communist Parties (Spanish and Catalan) and of the CNT. 
The data for the Franco Regime, which covers almost thirty-eight years, reflects the entry of new 
young elites, just as we might expect with the presence of a fascist movement and the Civil War 
generation; however, we also note a significant aging as the regime stabilized and ministerial rank 
was obtained through a cursus honorum process. The brief reforma/ruptura transition to 
democracy during the 1970s was not led by a new and young elite – with the exception of Prime 
Minister Suárez (who was born in 1932) and a few of his colleagues. Suárez’s relative youth was 
quite probably one part of the explanation for the hostility that he encountered.  
 
The Parliamentary Monarchy presents the most radical generation shift of all the regimes ana-
lyzed, with an average age of 44.7 years, and with 81 percent attaining office before their fiftieth 
birthday. Very few of the Parliamentary Monarchy’s ministers were more than children during 
the Civil War, and of those that were, none served under the PP. With the exception of the two 
military officers who served in Suárez’s democratic governments, no recent minister took part in 
the Civil War (although one of PSOE’s ministers fought in the French Resistance and was in-
terned in the Buchenwald concentration camp). This is not entirely surprising given the emer-
gence of new parties, such as the UCD, and the renewal of both PSOE’s and the PP’s leaderships 
prior to their electoral victories, not to mention the relative youth of the three Prime Ministers at 
the time of their first appointment (Suárez, forty-three; González, forty; and Aznar, forty-three), 
and the progressive exclusion of the previous political elites, which was completed following the 
PSOE’s electoral victory in October 1982. According to some interpretations, the pattern of 
Spain’s transition to democracy reflects a number of generational divides. In general terms, these 
divides relate to the generation of politicians that emerged during the 1950s, whose main tasks in-
volved dismantling the Franco regime, and paving the way for the restoration of democracy. 
Meanwhile, the generation that emerged during the 1960s entered the ranks of the opposition in 
order to fulfil their no less historic task of installing the left in power in 1982,
31 while the arrival 
of Aznar’s team at Moncloa in 1996, represented the incorporation of the first generation to 
emerge in a post-dictatorial context.  
 
As in most countries around the world, ministers in Spain have until recent times invariably been 
males – with the above mentioned exception of the anarchist, Federica Montseny, who attained 
this rank during the first year of the Civil War. A further forty-five years were to pass before the 
next woman entered the cabinet as Minister of Culture in the final UCD government, and almost   32
six more before González appointed two women to his government as Minister for Social Affairs 
and Government Spokesperson (appointments that were made in the wake of PSOE’s 1988 Con-
gress, which passed a resolution reserving for women 25 percent of the positions on all of the 
Party’s ruling bodies – this almost certainly provided the ‘moral’ impetus for González’s ap-
pointments). In each of the three examples given above, the ministries to which women were ap-
pointed were all created ad hoc, of a generalist nature and of little importance, which was a faith-
ful reflection of the low degree of specialist knowledge that Spanish women had had until fairly 
recent times. Women in Spain simply had not had the opportunity to take up political careers that 
would allow them to acquire any specialization (Bar 1989: 69-70).  
 
Although the number of female ministers increased in 1993, and again in 1996, women never ac-
counted for more than 23.5 percent of the total. In 1999, their numbers fell before stabilizing in 
the subsequent years. Since 2000, women have made up more than 30 percent of the membership 
of both houses of parliament (Congress and Senate), and from 1999 and 2000 respectively, the 
leader of Congress and of the Senate have been women. Women equally account for over 30 per-
cent of Spain’s representatives to the European parliament (Anuario El Pais 2000). The presence 
of women in the parliaments of the Autonomous Communities is also increasing at different rates: 
35 percent of Andalucian deputies and 40 percent of Valencian deputies are women (Anuario El 
Pais, 2001; Coller 1999: 196). The political importance of the ministerial positions occupied by 
women has also improved during both PP governments, with portfolios such as Education, 
Justice, Science and Technology, and even more recently Foreign Affairs, being added to the so-
cial portfolios that were previously considered to be the only ones suitable for women. 
 
Geographical and regional origins 
The geographical and regional origins of the ministerial elites – using place of birth as an in-
dicator – has changed throughout the years, partly as a result of demographic changes. As the 
number of ministers born in Madrid has increased, the number born in Spain’s former colonies 
has dwindled to zero. As can be seen in Table 6, the number of ministers who were not born in a 
major city represented less than one-third of the total in all periods except the early Restoration 
and the Second Republic. In this latter period, 45 percent of ministers were from rural or semi-
rural areas. Ministers of the two most recent periods have come overwhelmingly from urban 
areas, accounting to practically two-thirds of the total. 
 
Table 6: Place of birth of ministers (%) 
 Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Civil 
Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
Second Republic Franco 
Regime 
Transition to 
Democracy 
Parlia-
mentary 
Monarchy 
  I II      Civil 
War 
    
Madrid  16.2  20.2 27.7  7.8  6.5  25.0 51.5  30.8 
Major 
provincial 
cities
1  
43.2 46.8  41.6  46.1 60.8  42.5  30.3  41.5 
Rest of country  34.7  24.1  22.2  44.9  23.9  30.8  18.1  26.1 
Overseas 
territories 
2.5 4.4  5.6  0.0 2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Abroad  3.4 1.9  0.0  1.1 0.0  1.6  0.0  1.5 
Unknown  0.0 2.5  2.7  0.0 6.5  0.0  0.0  0.0 
N  117  158 36  89  46  120 33  130 
1 Provincial capital and other important cities                      
*Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.
 
Table 6a presents figures on the regional distribution of ministers according to their place of 
birth: specifying the over- or under-representation of each area in relation to its share of the popu-  33
lation at the time of birth. As in most countries, the over-representation of the capital is a con-
stant. However, according to our calculations, Madrid was much more over-represented during 
the transition and most of the older regimes than it has been during the Parliamentary Monarchy. 
During these earlier regimes, the proportion of ministers born in the capital was around six times 
its share of the population, while during the two republican periods the capital has provided ap-
proximately three to four times more ministers than its proportion of its population. 
 
In view of the autonomist/nationalist sentiments in Catalonia and the Basque Country, the pres-
ence or absence of ministers with roots in these areas is particularly interesting. The Catalans ob-
tained their most significant representation in the two Republics (roughly 15 percent) and the 
Parliamentary Monarchy (8.5 percent). During the 1930s Catalans were over-represented, some-
thing that can partially be explained by the very positive relation that Azaña developed with the 
Esquerra leader, Companys, and – for the Civil War period – by the failure of the military up-
rising in Barcelona that secured both the city and most of Catalonia for the Republic until January 
1939.
32 The Basque Country was poorly represented during the Constitutional Monarchy, which 
is not surprising given that so many Basques voted for the Carlists and other Catholic ‘non-
dynastic’ parties. This fact did not affect Navarra, however, where support for the Traditionalists 
and the PNV limited their representation in the mainly anticlerical Republican cabinets. This was 
not a problem during the Civil War, however, when both regions were over-represented by up to 
2.5 times their share of the population.  
 
Contrary to the image of a Castilian-dominated Spain, the Castilian-Leonese heartland was not 
strongly represented in either the Constitutional Monarchy or the Dictatorship’s cabinets. During 
the Second Republic, the picture was similar to that of the second Restoration period (10 percent 
of ministers from 15 percent of the population). Curiously enough, under Franco Old Castile and 
Leon’s representation declined even further, and only recovered during the transition of the 
1970s. Now, in a period during which the region’s population is in decline, it is slightly over-
represented in government for the first time. 
 
Table 6a: Regions of birth of ministers and level of representation (%)
* 
 Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Civil 
Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
Second Republic  Franco 
Regime 
Transition to 
Democracy 
Parlia-
mentary 
Monarchy 
  I II      Civil  War       
Madrid  16.2 >  20.3 >  27.7 >  7.8 >  10.9 >  25.0 >  51.5 >  30.8 > 
New 
Castile 
(excl. 
Madrid)  
3.4 <  0.6 <  0.0  4.4 <  0.0  3.3 <  0.0 <  1.5 < 
Old Castile 
and Leon 
8.1 <  10.7 <  5.5 <  10.2 <  10.9 <  6.7 <  9.0 <  13.1> 
Galicia  9.2 <  7.6 <  13.8 >  8.9 <  0.0  11.8 >  12.1 >  7.1 > 
Asturias  9.3 >  4.4 >  0.0  8.9 >  10.9 >  6.7 >  9.2 >  3.8 > 
Navarre  1.7 =  2.5 >  0.0  2.2 >  4.3 >  3.3 >  0.0  0.7 < 
Basque 
Country 
1.7 <  1.9 <  2.7 <  1.1 <  8.7 >  7.6 >  3.2 <  6.2 > 
Catalonia  4.2 <  7.0 <  5.6 <  14.6 >  15.2 >  7.6 <  6.0 <  8.5 < 
Aragón  0.8 <  1.3 >  5.6 >  5.6 >  4.3 <  4.2 <  0.0  3.1 < 
Valencia 
and Murcia 
9.2 <  6.3 <  5.5 <  10.0 <  10.9 =  4.2 <  3.2 <  5.3 < 
Andalucia  22.6 >  26.0 >  22.3 >  15.7 <  10.9 <  12.7 <  3.2 <  13.2 < 
Extre-
madura 
1.7 <  0.0  0.0  1.1 <  0.0  1.6 <  0.0  1.5 < 
Balearics  2.5 >  0.6 <  0.0  2.2 >  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.3 >   34
Canary 
Islands 
1.7 =  2.5 >  2.8 >  2.2 >  4.3 >  1.6 =  0.0  1.5 < 
Ceuta and 
Melilla 
0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.7  > 
Overseas 2.5  4.4  5.6  0.0 2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Abroad 3.4 1.9  0.0  1.1  0.0 1.6  0.0  0.0 
Unknown 0.0  1.9  2.7  0.0  6.5  0.0  0.0  0.0 
N 117  158  36  89  46  120  33  130 
*Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding 
= signifies that representation is equal to proportion of the total population 
> signifies that the area was over represented 
< signifies that the area was under represented 
(differences lower than 0.5%, or 1% in regions with over 10% of the national population, are ignored) 
Source: Censo de población de hecho por municipios y periodos. Madrid, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2002. 
According with data available, the year 1900 was taken as reference for ministers of the first five periods. For the 
Franco regime, Transition to democracy and Parliamentary Monarchy, 1910, 1930 and 1950, respectively. 
 
Spain’s largest region, Andalucia, has always had a significant presence within the ministerial 
elite; nevertheless, it has been greatly under-represented in proportion to its population since the 
Second Republic, and particularly so during the transition to democracy. The fact that Felipe 
González, who was born in Seville, was Prime Minister for thirteen years of the current regime, 
has done little to help Andalucian representation. Another populous region, Galicia, which is 
famed for its networks of political bosses (caciques) and local notables, has been also under-
represented, except during the Dictatatorship, the Franco regime – probably because this was 
Franco’s home region – and the last transitional period. Since then, the transitional period ex-
cepted, Galicia has been over-represented in cabinet. Valencia and Murcia, which are the last of 
the populous regions, fared well during the Second Republic because of their strong support for 
bourgeois republican parties – the Radicals in particular; since then, however, they have been ser-
iously under-represented at the ministerial level. All of this presents us with an overall picture in 
which no region has been totally excluded from the government of Spain, and no region has been 
able to dominate. The support of regimes, the personal ties of the political leaders, and the 
presence of anti-dynastic and nationalist parties all combine to affect – to some extent – regional 
representation in government. 
 
Educational credentials 
As can be seen from Table 7, the overwhelming majority of ministers, with the exception of those 
in office during the Civil War Republic, have been university graduates. While an overall ma-
jority of ministers studied law, during the Second Republic there was a substantial proportion of 
humanities graduates. During the Franco Regime, a large number of ministers had engineering 
degrees, while during the Parliamentary Monarchy there has been a high proportion of economics 
graduates (Table 7a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Educational level of ministers (%)
*   35
 Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Civil 
Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
Second Republic  Franco 
Regime 
Transition to 
Democracy 
Parlia-
mentary 
Monarchy 
  I  II     Civil  War     
Non-
university 
3.4 0.6  0.0  4.6 26.1  0.8  0.0  1.5 
University 
degree 
65.0  75.9  63.9 89.8  54.7  70.8 81.2  96.9 
Military 
graduation 
27.3 21.5  33.3  4.5  8.7  28.3  18.2  1.5 
Unknown  4.3 1.8  2.8  1.1 10.5  0.0  0.0  0.0 
N  117 158  36  89  46  120  33  130 
* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding 
 
Table 7a: Fields of higher education of civilian ministers (%)
* 
 Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Dictablanda  Second Republic  Franco 
Regime 
Transition to 
Democracy 
Parliamenta
ry Monarchy
  I  II     Civil  War     
Law  84.1  88.3  86.4 71.8  38.1  81.3 68.0  59.8 
Humanities  4.9 9.2  13.6  16.5  11.9 11.3  4.0  3.9 
Engineering 9.8  8.3  4.5  8.2  7.1  13.8  28.0  8.7 
Agronomy 
and 
Veterinary 
0.0  1.7  0.0 0.0  0.0  2.5 0.0  3.1 
Economics 
and Manage-
ment 
0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  8.8 8.0  28.3 
Math and 
Natural 
Sciences 
1.2  0.8  0.0 3.5  0.0  7.5 0.0  6.3 
Medicine 0.0  4.2  0.0  8.2 4.8  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Social 
Sciences 
0.0  0.0  0.0 1.2  2.4  5.0 4.0  7.1 
Other 1.2  3.3  0.0  0.0 0.0  2.5  0.0  2.4 
Unknown  1.2  1.7  4.5 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0 
N  82  120  22 85  42  80 25  127 
*  Multiple coding has been applied as some ministers held degrees in two or more academic fields, therefore 
percentages may not total 100 
 
The University of Madrid’s status as Spain’s main higher education establishment is reflected in 
the presence of a larger number of its graduates in the various cabinets. While the proportion has 
varied – slightly fewer during the first part of the twentieth century, slightly higher during the 
Parliamentary Monarchy (a partial reflection of Madrid’s demography) – Madrid graduates have 
been ever present. During the Second Republic, the increased number of Catalan ministers led to 
a rise in the proportion of graduates from the University of Barcelona. Graduates of private uni-
versities, and the Jesuit University (which was granted official recognition by Primo de Rivera) in 
particular, were present during the Dictatorship, the Franco Regime and the transition to democ-
racy. The presence of a graduate from the Jesuit University in Civil War Republic cabinets may 
seem slightly incongruous, especially given the regime’s anticlerical policies; however, it can be 
explained by the presence of a leader of the PNV – Irujo. 
 
Of the few Constitutional Monarchy ministers who had studied abroad, almost all had done so in 
France. The number of ministers with foreign degrees increases slightly during the Republic, as a 
number of them had obtained fellowship programs that took them to Germany; however, France 
continued to be the preferred destination in this category. There were many more ministers with   36
foreign degrees in the Franco regime, when the United States makes its first appearance as a des-
tination. The U.S. became a more popular destination with the transition to democracy and during 
the Parliamentary Monarchy, although for all this time France has remained the location of 
choice. Many of the biographies that have been written about, and the autobiographies that have 
been written by, ministers of the Parliamentary Monarchy indicate that a large number of min-
isters have studies abroad at some time in their educational career. This is a major change from 
the relative isolation of Spanish elites during the earlier periods (Table 7b). 
 
Table 7b: Places of the higher education studies of ministers (%)
* 
 Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Civil 
Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
Second 
Republic 
Franco 
Regime 
Transition to 
Democracy 
Parlia-
mentary 
Monarchy 
  I II      Civil 
War 
    
Madrid 71.9  56.7  52.1 50.0  44.0  76.5  81.5  60.3 
Barce-lona 3.9  7.5  4.3 15.0  8.0  7.1  0.0  10.3 
Granada 0.0  5.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 5.9  0.0  0.0 
La Laguna  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Murcia 1.3  0.8  0.0  0.0 0.0  1.2  0.0  0.0 
Oviedo  3.9  4.1 0.0  7.5  8.0  3.5 11.1  0.8 
Sala-manca 2.6  0.8  4.3  5.0  0.0  3.5  7.4  3.2 
Santiago de 
Compo-
stela 
6.6 6.6  13.0  3.7  0.0  2.4  3.7  1.6 
Seville 9.2  7.5  0.0  6.2  8.0  1.2  0.0  7.1 
Valencia 5.3  2.5  4.3  8.7 0.0  4.7  0.0  3.2 
Valla-dolid 1.3  4.1  4.3  0.0 4.0  4.7  3.7  1.6 
Zaragoza 0.0 0.0  8.6  0.0  0.0  2.4  7.4  0.8 
Deusto 0.0  0.0  4.3  0.0  4.0  14.1  11.1  4.0 
Other 11.8  4.1 26.1  12.5  12.0  7.1  3.7  8.7 
Unknown 13.2 45.0  8.6  0.0 0.0  1.2  3.7  4.0 
N 76  120  23  80  25  85  27  126 
*Multiple coding has been used as some ministers made their studies in different places, therefore percentages may not 
total 100. 
N=Number of university educated ministers, including legal staff members of the armed services. 
 
Table 7c: Foreign countries in which ministers attended university (%) 
 Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Civil 
Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
Second 
Republic 
Franco 
Regime 
Transition to 
Democracy 
Parlia-
mentary 
Monarchy 
  I II      Civil 
War 
    
United 
Kingdom 
0.8 0.6  0.0  1.1  2.1  4.1  3.0  8.4 
France 5.9  3.7  2.8 6.7  2.1  5.0  0.0  12.3 
United 
States 
0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.1  6.0  7.6 
Italy 0.8  1.8  5.7  2.2  2.1  1.6  0.0  4.6 
Germany 0.8 0.0  0.0  2.2  4.3  3.3  3.0  3.0 
Other 0.0  0.0 0.0  1.1 0.0  6.6  3.0  5.3 
N 117  158  36  89  46  120  33  130 
N=Number of ministers in each period. 
 
Occupational profile 
The affinity between politics and government and the legal profession, and its decreasing impor-
tance of recent times, can be found in all countries. The emergence, and even dominance, of other   37
professional specializations is confirmed in the Spanish data. As can be seen from Table 8, their 
numbers are particularly large during the second phase of the Constitutional Monarchy – re-
flecting the stable and continuous cursus honorum – and continues to be significant in the Repub-
lic, before diminishing during the Franco regime (although many senior civil servants and uni-
versity professors of this period also had legal training, with some possibly having practiced law). 
 
Ever since the nineteenth century, university professors have always been present in the minister-
ial elite. However, this occupational group was to gain real ascendancy with the advent of the 
Second Republic. Their presence does not decline during the Franco regime, reflecting the po-
litical diversity of academic professions. The number of professors declined during the transition 
to democracy, before coming back strongly in the Parliamentary Monarchy, where they account 
for 40 percent of all ministers – one-fifth of those who served in PP cabinets – not all with full 
tenure. School teachers have not made much impression within the political elites, with the one 
minor exception of the Second Republic, where the rise of the provincial middle class was also 
reflected in the number of middle ranking civil servants, notaries and property registrars – an 
occupation that is somewhere between liberal professional and civil servant. These has also been 
a dearth of engineers within the ministerial cadres. The most striking development of the last 
twenty-five years, however, is the extremely rapid growth in the number of economists in 
government. 
 
The presence of military officers, particularly during the non-democratic periods, is significant; 
although we should remember that cabinets were substantially smaller during the earlier periods, 
and that military officers very rarely occupied civilian ministries. We should also note that a third 
military portfolio was created in 1939 and existed until 1977 – giving more opportunities to the 
men in uniform. The most significant development was their dramatic decline with the onset of 
the Second Republic, during which both military portfolios were held by civilians, and yet again 
during the Parliamentary Monarchy, with the concentration of the three military ministries into 
the single Ministry of Defense, which since 1979 has been held by civilians (although Aznar re-
cently appointed a former Navy lawyer to this position – see Table 4). Curiously enough, no other 
legal staff members of any of the armed services – all of whom have a second profession – has 
held a military portfolio during the period being examined. It is only during the Constitutional 
Monarchy and the Franco Regime that armed forces’ lawyers have been in cabinet, with some 
occupying the Interior and other positions, including that of Prime Minister during the second 
Restoration period, when García Prieto led the government four times. Two General Secretaries 
of Franco’s Movimiento were also armed forces’ lawyers over a combined period of twenty years. 
Some of the ministers during the Franco Regime had retired during the Second Republic, and had 
exercised different professions before becoming ministers. 
 
In their memoirs, many of the leading politicians of the Constitutional Monarchy describe their 
professional activities as writers and journalists: reflecting the importance of the press in shaping 
public opinion. During the first phase of this regime, their number is considerably greater among 
ministers connected to the Liberal Party (20.7 percent) than those in the Conservative Party (12.7 
percent); however, this difference increased during the regime’s later phase as the proportion of 
different occupations changed. A significant number of Second Republican politicians were either 
writers (e.g. Azaña) or journalists; however, these occupational groups lose their importance 
within Franco’s ministerial elites. Moreover, with the disappearance of the party press, and as a 
consequence of the social changes that had taken place with democratization, these professions 
have not managed to regain their lost significance. 
 
Table 8: Ministers’ occupational background (%)
*   38
 Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Civil 
Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
Second 
Republic 
Franco 
Regime 
Transition 
to 
Democracy 
Parlia-
mentary 
Monarchy 
  I II      Civil 
War 
    
Military  29.9  22.8 38.9 4.5  8.7  33.3  24.2  2.3 
  Navy  12.8 5.7  13.9  2.2 4.3  10.8
† 12.1  0.0 
  Army 14.5  14.6 19.4 2.2  4.3  17.5  6.1  1.5 
Legal staff  2.6  2.5  5.5  0.0  0.0  5.0  6.1  0.8 
Judge or 
Prosecutor 
11.1 7.6  5.5  5.6 2.2  3.3  3.0  3.8 
Diplomat  13.6  8.8 0.0  14.6  10.9  7.5 24.2  4.6 
Senior civil 
servant 
4.2 4.4  5.5  8.9  2.2  26.6  30.3  25.3 
Notary  0.0  3.8 0.0  10.1  4.4  5.0 12.1  3.1 
Middle 
civil 
servant 
2.5 0.0  2.7  2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
State cor-
poration 
official 
0.8 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.5  0.0  4.6 
Central 
bank 
official 
0.8 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.0 
Interna-
tional org. 
official 
0.0 0.0  0.0  3.3  0.0  0.8  3.0  1.5 
University 
professor 
15.3 11.4  11.1  25.8  13.0  17.5  18.1  40.0 
Teacher 0.8  0.6  0.0  4.5  4.3 0.8  0.0  6.1 
Writer or 
journalist 
18.8 12.6  2.7  5.6 10.8  0.8  0.0  0.7 
Lawyer 53.8  58.8  69.4  53.9  30.4  34.2  45.4  41.5 
Doctor or 
pharmacist 
0.0 3.8  0.0  7.8  2.1  0.0  0.0  0.7 
Engineer  4.3  5.1 2.7  6.7  4.3  5.8 18.1  5.3 
Economist 0.0  1.9  0.0  0.0 0.0  0.0  3.0  15.3 
Manager 0.0  0.0  0.0  1.1 2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Business-
man, indus-
trialist or 
banker 
4.3 3.2  16.6  1.1  0.0  1.7  12.1  5.4 
Landowner 
or farmer 
0.6 0.8  0.0  1.1  0.0  0.8  0.0  5.4 
Employee 0.0  0.0  0.0  2.2 6.5  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Manual 
worker 
0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  19.5  0.0  0.0  0.7 
Unknown 1.7 1.3  2.8  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8 
N 117  158  36  89  46  120  33  130 
*Occupation prior to first ministerial appointment. Multiple coding has been applied. 
† Including Air Force.  
N=Number of individuals. 
 
PSOE’s electoral weakness during the early decades of the twentieth century effectively excluded 
it from access to power. With the onset of the Second Republic, however, Largo Caballero and 
other working class politicians entered government. There were no ministers from working-class 
backgrounds during the Franco regime, and there has been less than a handful during the   39
Parliamentary Monarchy – all during PSOE governments. This has also been the case for farmers, 
since in Spain there are no significant agrarian parties, allied to the fact that landowners – both 
nobles and bourgeois – were more likely to describe themselves as belonging to another pro-
fession, laying stress on their academic qualifications, during the earlier regimes. This has led to a 
situation in which there is an absence of ministers identifying themselves with the agrarian milieu 
– despite its demographic, economic and social importance during the earlier periods being 
studied. 
 
Although our data concerning the private-public nature of the professional occupations needs 
more work in respect of ‘mixed occupations’ (i.e. to discriminate between the main and the occa-
sional or residual professions), it is nevertheless clear that, with the exception of ministers in the 
Civil War Republican cabinets, socio-professional links to the state is a constant of the entire per-
iod under investigation. This picture is particularly characteristic of the Franco Regime and the 
transition to democracy, while there is a greater professional equilibrium with the ministers under 
Alfonso XIII and the Second Republic (Table 8a). 
 
Table 8a: Occupational distribution of ministers according to employment status (%)
* 
 Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Civil 
Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
Second 
Republic 
Franco 
Regime 
Transition 
to 
Democracy 
Parlia-
mentary 
Monarchy 
  I II      Civil 
War 
    
Public 50.4  48.7  61.1 28.1 17.4  72.5  60.6  57.1 
Private 30.7  42.5  33.4  46.1 58.7  15.0  12.1  24.2 
Mixed 18.8  6.8  2.7  24.7 17.4  10.8  27.2  11.7 
Unknow
n 
0.0 1.8  2.7  1.1  6.5  1.6  0.0  7.0 
N 117  158  36  89  46  120  33 130 
* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. 
N=Number of known cases. 
 
Social origins: the nobility 
Unfortunately, with the exception of the nobility and land-ownership during the second half of 
the twentieth century, data concerning social position and parental occupation that would allow 
us to determine the social origins of ministers, is quite fragmentary for most periods. In general 
terms, however, it would not be too contentious to assert that the ministerial elites have been 
dominated by people of middle class origins, and that, moreover, this group has, with the ex-
ception of the brief Civil War Republic, become hegemonic during the twentieth century. The 
greatest middle-class component can be found within Franco’s ministerial cadres – with the Cau-
dillo himself being the son of a modest sailor. Meanwhile, the ministers of both the Second Re-
public and, especially, the Parliamentary Monarchy have tended to be of professional middle-
class origins – with a few exceptions during PSOE governments (Cuenca and Miranda 1998: 77 
ff). 
 
The assessment of the aristocratic component presents many complexities. First of all, we have to 
be sure that aristocratic background precedes appointment to cabinet. With the exception of the 
republican years, quite a few members of the elite – ministers, parliamentarians, military officers 
– were elevated to the peerage either while in office or shortly after leaving it (or, as in the cases 
of assassinated Prime Ministers: Canalejas, Dato, Carrero, and most of the few generals of the 
Franco regime that got a title from him, posthumously). We obviously do not count them as hav-
ing aristocratic origins. Another problem, one that can be handed differently, concerns the hidal-
gos, i.e. those of aristocratic descent (which was necessary for a career in Spain’s eighteenth-   40
century army and navy), many of whom were of a low economic status – but usually with title to 
some land: should these people be considered to be members of the nobility? The hidalguía can 
be even more confusing considering that those coming from the Basque country and some north-
ern provinces could all claim to be hidalgos. To resolve this, we have defined members of the no-
bility to be individuals with an aristocratic title. An additional problem is caused by assessing the 
date at which aristocratic title was awarded, in some cases the minister had been made a peer im-
mediately prior to his ministerial appointment, in some others they had inherited their aristocratic 
title through their family’s earlier military, political or, increasingly, business successes. In some 
studies, e.g. Nikolaus von Prevadovich’s examination of the Austrian elites, those peers who ob-
tained aristocratic title during the nineteenth century as a reward for their family’s earlier profes-
sional successes are not considered to be aristocrats, simply because the ‘old’ aristocracy was un-
willing to consider them to be their equal (which is apparently different from the situation in 
Prussia and the United Kingdom). In order to distinguish the ‘old’ from the ‘new’ aristocracy, we 
have included the former in a separate category – those from aristocratic families that obtained 
their title before 1808. 
 
With our less stringent criteria, international comparisons seem to suggest a much weaker pres-
ence of the Spanish aristocracy in the political elite (further analysis shows this to be the same for 
other elites, including the military).
33 One main reason for this may be its irrelevance in con-
structing the state, which differs clearly from the parts played by the aristocracies of most of the 
older European states, including Portugal:  
 
The nobility’s ... image at the beginning of the nineteenth century was a 
negative one. It was a perception that neither the Napoleonic War, nor the 
ensuing political changes did much to rectify ... having lost their local privi-
leges, those without title disappeared from the political scene; while those 
with title, particularly the important ones, tended to renounce their old life 
styles and integrated themselves into the urban centers where they became 
the upper-class; the small local nobility, to the extent that it had survived, 
formed pockets of resistance against the modernisation of the state and the 
nationalisation of politics – they supported the Carlist cause and they were 
the bosses controlling the caciques. (Alvárez Junco, 2001: 88 ff.) 
 
Our data is consistent with this analysis, and demonstrates the relatively small contribution made 
by the ‘old’ aristocracy towards the cabinets of the Constitutional Monarchy up to 1925. The 
‘new’ aristocracy, many of whom were actually of middle-class origin, made an almost equal 
contribution (Table 9). During the third period, the aristocracy made its largest contribution with-
in the transitional government of Admiral Aznar; however, all but one of these aristocratic minis-
ters were members of the ‘new’ aristocracy. The Second Republic, which refused to recognize 
aristocratic titles, had no aristocratic ministers – either from the ‘old’ or the ‘new’ aristocracy.
34 
Franco’s Regime, while restoring and recognising noble titles - including those of the Carlist 
kings – did not represent a return to aristocratic government; this is because those who were 
awarded peerages after they had left office (often posthumously) do not meet our definition of 
what constitutes membership of the nobility. Since 1975, aristocratic presence within the minis-
terial elites has remained very low.
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Table 9: Members of the titled nobility among ministers 
 Old  nobility 
(pre-1808) 
New nobility  Total   
  N % N % N %   
1874-1902  11  9.4  12 10.3 23 19.7 (117)
1902-1923  13 8.2 14 8.9 27  17.1 (158)
1925-1931  2  5.5  11 30.6 13 36.1  (46)
1938-1975  5 4.2 2 1.7 7 5.8 (120)
1975-1977  0 0.0 1 3.0 1 3.0  (33)
1977-2001  2 0.8 0 0.0 2 1.5 (120)
Source: Grandezas y titulos del Reino: guia oficial (1910; 1963-4). 
 
Political career – ministerial office 
To accede to a cabinet position in the parliamentary regimes generally presumed previous elec-
tion as deputies. This was particularly true in the Constitutional Monarchy and the Republic, 
where a large number of ministers had previously been elected more than three times. In the Re-
public, which only had three legislatures with high turnover due to the changing political winds, a 
large number of ministers had only served in one or two, and only a small minority in more than 
three – meaning that they had also been elected under the Constitutional Monarchy. The number 
with no parliamentary experience was relatively small (Tables 10, 10a and 10b). 
 
Table 10: Political offices held by ministers (%)* 
 Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Civil 
Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
Second Republic  Franco 
Regime 
Transition to 
Democracy 
Parlia-
mentary 
Monarchy 
  I II      Civil 
War 
    
None  7.6 10.7  38.8  20.2 26.1  8.3  0.0  24.6 
Mayor / 
councillor 
16.2 18.3  11.1  30.3  17.4  5.8  6.1  8.5 
Provincial 
president
1 
0.0 2.5  0.0  2.2  4.3  1.6  3.0  1.5 
Regional 
president / 
councillor 
n/a n/a  n/a  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  7.7 
Regional 
deputy 
0.0 0.0  0.0  7.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.6 
National 
deputy 
79.5 77.2  51.4  80.9  65.2  9.2  0.0  53.8 
Senator 45.3  34.2  25.0  5.6 0.0  0.8  0.0  16.2 
5.0 n/a  n/a  Member of 
Corporatist 
Chamber
2 
N/a n/a  4.3  0.0  0.0  47.5
3 46.5  12.3 
Prefect 
(Civil 
Governor) 
24.7 20.8  13.8  8.9  6.5  16.6  15.2  3.1 
Director 
General 
29.1 37.9  22.2  22.5  19.6  28.3  54.5  18.5 
Secretary / 
Under 
secretary of 
State
4 
34.2 41.1  30.5  11.2  19.6  26.6  27.3  26.9 
Minister
5 23.1  22.2  33.4  3.4  32.6 1.7  15.2  7.7 
N  117  158  36 89  46  120 33  130 
*0 Before their first appointment to Cabinet. As multiple coding has been applied where ministers have held several 
political office, the percentages may not total 100.   42
1 The office (designated during non-democratic regimes) elected by indirect suffrage to administer each province. 
2 Primo de Rivera’s Asamblea Nacional Consultiva (1927-30); Franco’s ‘organic’ Cortes (1943-77). 
3 When the 32 ministers appointed prior to inauguration of Franco’s Cortes are excluded, this figure rises to 65.5%. 
4 The position of Secretary of State was created in July 1977. 
5 Those who had served as ministers in earlier regimes. 
 
Table 10a: Parliamentary experience prior to first ministerial appointment (%) 
 Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Civil 
Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
Second Republic  Franco 
Regime 
Transition to 
Democracy 
Parlia-
mentary 
Monarchy 
  I II      Civil 
War 
    
None  8.5 13.3  36.1  19.1 34.8  91.8  100.0  40.8 
Unelected 
senator only
1 
0.9 2.5  5.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.8 
Elected 
senator only
2 
9.4 5.7  5.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5 
Member of 
lower 
chamber 
only or of 
both 
chambers 
81.2 78.5  52.8  80.9  65.2  9.2  0.0  53.8 
N  117  158  36 89  46  120 33  130 
Sources: Paredes et al.; Cuenca and Miranda (1998); computerized rolls of the Congreso de los Diputados (1977-
2001); Próceres y Senadores, 1834-1923; Senadores, 1977-1993; and computerized rolls for Senate in remaining 
legislatures. 
1 Until 1923. 
2 There was no Senate between 1923 and 1977. 
 
  Table 10b: Ministers’ previous parliamentary experience as deputies (%)
* 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Civil 
Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
Second Republic  Franco 
Regime 
Transition to 
Democracy 
Parliamentar
y Monarchy 
Number of 
times elected 
I II      Civil 
War 
    
1 6.8  3.2  2.9  25.8  13.0  2.5  0.0  20.8 
2 3.4  2.5  5.7  28.1  30.4  1.7  0.0  14.6 
3  4.3 3.2  2.8  3.4 13.0  1.7  0.0  10.0 
>3  65.0  69.0 41.2  23.6  8.7 3.3  0.0  8.5 
None 20.5  22.6  47.2  19.1  34.8  90.8  100.0 46.2 
N  117  158  36 89  46  120 33  130 
* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. 
 
Parliamentary experience, particularly in the lower chamber, has been important during the Par-
liamentary Monarchy, with one-third of all ministers having been elected deputies twice or more. 
Since it was a new regime, however, without any continuity with the Second Republic, the coop-
tation of outsiders on the basis of their expertise became more significant. Two-fifths of ministers 
at this time were never members of any parliament, rising to 46 percent if we exclude those 
whose only previous parliamentary experience was as senators. 
 
More than one-half of the members of Primo de Rivera’s ministries had no previous parliamen-
tary experience. Their numbers were large in the final ministries of the Constitutional Monarchy, 
mainly as a consequence of the recuperation of veteran politicians. Over 90 percent of Franco’s 
ministers had never served in a legislature – a fact that should not surprise us given the Regime’s 
rejection of political parties. The Falange had never obtained representation in the Second Repub-  43
lic’s Cortes, and only a few members of the extreme right-wing anti-republican parties that did 
have parliamentary representation during the Republic, Renovación Española (Spanish Renewal) 
and the Tradicionalistas, were represented in Franco’s early ministries. The distinctiveness of the 
Civil War Republic is reflected in the incorporation of communists and anarcho-syndicalists into 
government, where 34.8 percent of all ministers had no previous parliamentary experience. 
 
With the important exception of the Republic – a regime in which one-third of its ministers had 
previously served as mayors and local councillors – the presence of ministers whose only pre-
vious political experience was gained in local politics was uncommon. The Franco Regime, dur-
ing which most mayors, councillors and provincial council presidents were appointed by the civil 
governor and the Minister of the Interior, had the least number of ministers with experience only 
at the local level, followed by the last transition to democracy and Primo de Rivera’s Dictator-
ship, which were also periods during which municipal governments were not popularly elected, 
or only partially (during the transition). In the Parliamentary Monarchy, less than 10 percent of 
ministers have previously had local political experience, a fact that probably has more to do with 
the traditional separation of local and national politics that Spain shares with its neighbor, Por-
tugal, than with the lack of sufficient time that has passed in which to develop a career through 
this long route: in any case, this explanation can only possibly be relevant in the case of ministers 
in the UCD governments. 
 
The data indicates that, with the exception of the Second Republic, ministers with previous ex-
perience in senior position within the state’s central administration is extremely common. At least 
one-quarter of all ministers in the Parliamentary Monarchy have previously been either an Under-
secretary or a Secretary of State – positions that were created in 1977. The same is true of the 
Constitutional Monarchy, where almost one-quarter of the ministers had previously been 
Directors General – a senior position that was commonly held to represent the culmination of an 
administrative career, although it was a political appointment. More than one-half of the thirty-
three ministers during the transition to democracy had also been Directors General. Much rarer, in 
all of the regimes being examined, was the presence of former Civil Governors; this is particu-
larly true of both the democratic regimes and the Civil War Republic, where the presence of peo-
ple with this experience was extremely exceptional. 
 
The creation of the Autonomous Communities during the Parliamentary Monarchy has led to ex-
perience at regional government level providing the final step towards national office; indeed, 
quite often either this or a career in parliament represent the main route to attain national office. 
This tendency, which was already important during the first PSOE government, has become ac-
centuated during the most recent legislatures, given that the PP’s victories in several important 
Autonomous Communities preceded their first general election victory in 1996 (José Maria Az-
nar, was President of Castile la Mancha immediately prior to becoming Prime Minister in 1996). 
 
Unfortunately, our data on political careers and links with organized interest groups during the 
earlier regimes being examined is rather incomplete, while that on the Franco Regime requires 
more study. Nevertheless, it would not appear to be too controversial to state that a large propor-
tion of ministers during democratic periods were leaders of their respective parties at either the 
national or the regional levels, an assertion that seems to be confirmed by the few PSOE and 
CEDA ministers during the Second Republic, and by the majority of ministers during the present 
Parliamentary Monarchy (Baon 2001; García Guereta 2001; Hopkins 1999; Huneeus 1985; 
Parrado 2001). As for the interest groups, we have already noted the presence of trade union lead-
ers in some of the Second Republic’s governments, particularly Largo Caballero’s presence in 
Civil War Republican ministries. There have only been a few isolated examples of business lead-  44
ers obtaining ministerial position, which, surprisingly, was not the result of the precarious nature 
of organized business interest groups in Spain until recent times (Linz 1981).  
 
Accurate data is available that indicates the presence in republican cabinets of a significant num-
ber of Freemasons, just as during the Sexenio. At least twenty ministers had been members of a 
Lodge, although we should be aware that one of the most prominent – Manuel Azaña – only 
joined after he became a cabinet minister. This group – which mainly consists of members of Ac-
ción Republicana, Izquierda Republicana and the Radical Party, as well as members of the vari-
ous regionalist parties – included three Prime Ministers, one of which was also President of the 
Republic. Three of them were also ministers during the Civil War Republic, two as Prime Minis-
ter.
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Ministers with links to pressure groups during both the Franco Regime and the transition to de-
mocracy – excluding those connected to the large bureaucratic bodies – maintained casual asso-
ciations with Acción Católica, the ACNdeP and Opus Dei, particularly given that, with the excep-
tion of the Chambers of Commerce, most organized business interest groups had ceased to exist. 
The practical absence of representatives of organized business groups within the cabinets of the 
Parliamentary Monarchy is interesting – there has only been one, during the UCD governments. 
More interesting, however, has been the dearth of trade unionists obtaining ministerial rank – 
particularly given the fact that the country was governed by PSOE between 1982 and 1996. 
 
The proportion of ministers maintaining prolonged ministerial careers of four or more years is 
much greater under the Parliamentary Monarchy than during the shorter and more unstable re-
gime, as well as during the transitional periods. The fact that we also find that this proportion ex-
ceeds that found during the Constitutional Monarchy is more difficult to explain when we take 
into account that, for the purposes of calculating this variable, this regime had been considered as 
a continuous whole, and that the Parliamentary Monarchy has seen three successive parties in 
government during its twenty-five-year existence – which is little more than one-half as long as 
the duration of the First Restoration, which was extremely stable for the first half of its existence 
(Table 11). 
 
Table 11: Duration of ministerial careers (%)
* 
 Constitu-
tional 
Monarchy 
I and II 
Civil 
Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
Second 
Republic 
Second 
Republic/ 
Civil War 
Franco 
Regime 
Transition to 
Democracy 
Parlia-
mentary 
Monarchy 
< 30 days  5.4  2.8  4.5  21.7  0.0  0.0  0.0 
30 days – 1 
year 
42.5 44.4  73.0  56.5  10.0  75.8  13.1 
1-3.9 years  36.3  33.3  22.5  21.7  37.5  24.2  53.8 
4-7.9  years  14.6 19.4 0.0  0.0  29.2  0.0  25.4 
> 8 years  1.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  23.3  0.0  7.7 
N 240  36  89  46  120  33  130 
* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. Figures include all ministers to 9 July 2002, the date of the second 
Aznar government’s most recent cabinet re-shuffle. 
N=Number of ministers. 
 
The majority of ministers led only one department, regardless of the regime. This tends to suggest 
that there was a high degree of specialization. The pattern was weakest during both the second 
phase of the Constitutional Monarchy and in the democratic periods. It reached its zenith during 
the Franco Regime, where the ministers were either specialists or were appointed to political 
portfolios according to the political strength of the respective ‘political families’. The proportion 
of ministers occupying three or more cabinet positions was greatest during the Constitutional   45
Monarchy and the Second Republic, reflecting both these regimes’ lesser emphasis on 
specialization, and, in the case of the former, the existence of a distinct political class that was 
participating in its cursus honorum by gaining experience in different ministerial positions. The 
proportion of non-specialist ministers is significant during the Constitutional Monarchy, the Sec-
ond Republic, and the Parliamentary Monarchy: periods during which the occupation of two dif-
ferent ministries for political reasons is a frequent occurrence, given the multiparty and factional-
ist nature of these regimes (Table 11a). 
 
Table 11a: Mobility of ministers through portfolios (%)
* 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Civil Directorate/ 
Dictablanda 
Second 
Republic 
Franco 
Regime
Transition 
to 
Democracy 
Parlia-
mentary 
Monarchy
Number 
of 
different 
posts held  I II      Civil 
War 
    
1 74.4  61.4  75.0  64.0  69.6  85.0 78.8  66.2 
2 13.7  23.4  22.2  23.6  23.9  11.7 21.2  24.6 
3 7.7  7.0  2.8  9.0  6.5  3.3  0.0  7.7 
4+ 4.3  8.2  0.0  3.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5 
N 117  158  36  89  46  120  33  130 
* Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. 
N=Number of different portfolios held by cabinet ministers over their entire ministerial career during each period. 
Interim portfolios have been excluded. 
 
One theme that future studies of political elites will have to pay increasing attention to, given the 
federal and national structures within the Spanish state, is the movement of elites from the center 
to the Autonomous Communities, and vice versa. As we have seen, some politicians who had es-
tablished themselves within the Autonomous Communities went on to become ministers at the 
national level. Similarly, a number of national ministers have also moved in the opposite direc-
tion: a journey that has been made both directly from the cabinet, and after several years in op-
position at the national level. To this tendency, we also have to be aware of the European Union, 
which will lead to even more movement from Madrid to Brussels and Strasbourg. Even interna-
tional organizations, such as the United Nations (UNESCO in particular) and, more recently, the 
Secretary General of NATO, have provided further career opportunities for ministers of the Par-
liamentary Monarchy. 
  
Speculating about the overall composition of Spanish cabinets over the years enables us to sug-
gest some general conclusions. The ministerial elite is fairly heterogeneous; it has largely been re-
cruited from every part of the country; and it has not been dominated by any particular age group. 
In terms of occupational backgrounds, civil servants, military officers and professionals have had 
a significant presence by which the ministerial elite may be characterized. Most ministers have 
come from either middle-class or upper middle-class backgrounds. If we are to accept their self-
descriptions, taken from their memoirs and other sources, we see that relatively few of them have 
been either businessmen, farmers or landowners with no ancillary occupations (unlike the proud 
junkers of East Elbia), and that, unlike many British Labour Party Members of Parliament, 
practically none of them was from a manual labor, trade union background. Their professional 
backgrounds tends to suggest that ideas, ideologies, mentalities and legalistic considerations were 
as, or even more important to them than the representation of economic or class interests.   46
NOTES 
 
1  The name given to the short transitional sub-period between Primo de Rivera’s resignation in early 
1930 to the proclamation of the Second Republic in April 1931. Two civilian governments, both 
headed by a military officer, were set up during this stage. 
2  ‘Instauration’ would probably be a more appropriate label to characterize the initial phase of regime 
change for two main reasons: on the one hand, Franco had originally designed a new type of monarchy 
that was founded by himself, and not necessarily linked to the old dynasty; on the other hand, Juan 
Carlos’s father, Don Juan, who was in exile in Portugal when Franco died in November 1975, did not 
renounce his right of succession to the Spanish crown in favor of his son until 17 months later, just a 
few weeks before the first general elections. However, it is clear that this monarchy could not be a 
simple continuation of Franco’s regime. It could be argued that Don Juan’s claim was weakened both 
by the fact that, many years earlier, he had approved the education of Juan Carlos in Spain under Fran-
co’s supervision, and that he never contested either the proclamation of Juan Carlos as Franco’s 
successor, ‘with the title of King’, in 1969, or his final proclamation as head of state. In any case, as 
professor Tomás Villarroya wrote in his comments on the 1978 Constitution, Don Juan’s final 
renunciation of his dynastic rights, and his son’s acceptance of those rights that his father had received 
from Alfonso XIII ‘renewed the continuity of succession, and in someway, the instauration of a 
monarchy in a dynasty initiated by don Juan Carlos was converted into a restoration.’ 
3  It could be argued that the transition process did not really start until July 1976, following Suárez’s ap-
pointment as Prime Minister by King Juan Carlos. However, the fact that Franco’s death cleared the 
way for a new Head of State who immediately declared his desire to be ‘King of all the Spanish peo-
ple,’ then the entry of some individuals who had recently made public calls for a return to democracy 
into the first cabinet of the Parliamentary Monarchy, and the timid steps taken towards opening up the 
regime by this cabinet allows us to identify that moment as the beginning of the transition process. As 
far as the end of the transition period is concerned, it is clear that it had not yet been completed prior to 
the approval of the 1978 Constitution through a popular referendum. In fact, the transition was proba-
bly not completed until the Catalan and Basque autonomy statutes were approved in 1979. 
4  By the same token, the regime could not be defined, strictu sensu, as parliamentary until the 
derogation of the Leyes Fundamentales by the new constitution in 1978. Nevertheless, the fact that 
both King Juan Carlos and the cabinet resulting from the first free elections – certainly an important 
moment is executive-legislative relations – imposed upon themselves institutional power restraints – 
the final one being acceptance of regular control by Cortes from November 1977 – would justify the 
use of the label ‘Parliamentary Monarchy’ to describe the entire period following the inauguration of 
the Constituent Assembly. 
5  The Supreme State Council was created by Royal Decree in July 1787. It included the creation of 
seven secretariats, and may be considered to be the predecessor of the modern Council of Ministers 
since it was the first time that this type of body had a collective character, as well as a stable and 
formal existence. It was suppressed in February 1792, and substituted by the Council of State, which 
was the reestablishment of an earlier institution. The Council of Ministers was created by Royal 
Decree in November 1823 as the King’s advisory and consultative body (Bar 1983: 101-5 ff). 
6  General Primo de Rivera substituted it in 1923 with a Military Directorate, which was itself replaced 
two years later by a Civil Directorate. At the beginning of the Civil War, the insurgents created the Na-
tional Defense Council (Junta de Defensa Nacional), which was replaced by the State Technical 
Council (Junta Técnica del Estado) on 1 October 1936. Finally, a cabinet composed of ordinary 
ministerial departments was reintroduced by a law of 30 January 1938. 
7  The Bayonne Stature changed the secretariats into ministries for the first time. 
8  The exact date of the creation of the first Restoration cabinet – the Regency Cabinet (Ministerio 
Regencia) that was led by the Conservative Party leader, Cánovas – is 31 December 1874, only two 
days after Alfonso XII, who was in Britain at the time, was proclaimed King of Spain by General 
Martínez Campos in Sagunto (Valencia). This cabinet was confirmed by the King on 13 February 
1875, once he officially became Head of the Spanish State. General elections were not called until one 
year after the pronunciamiento; however, it is our opinion that the fact there were no substantial 
differences between the composition of the three non-representative cabinets preceding those   47
elections, and those immediately following the introduction of the new constitution, justifies all of 
them being included in the Constitutional Monarchy. 
9  Juan J. Linz and Rocío de Terán’s original files, extending from 1808 to 1960, were computerized as 
IBM cards thirty years ago – unfortunately, however, modern computers are unable to read them. The 
main sources used by Linz and Jerez for Francoism – were the Enciclopedia Espasa, the Guía Oficial 
de España, the Anuario Militar de España, the Guía Oficial de Grandezas y Títulos del Reino, the of-
ficial records of the various bureaucratic bodies, biographies, personal memoirs, and the daily press. 
Etc. (for more details on these and other sources, see Jerez 1982: 46-48; 488-9). 
10  Although this unpublished source details each deputy’s electoral district for each legislature, there re-
main some lacunae. For the missing cases, we checked the work published by Cuenca and Miranda 
(1998), even although they offer little information in respect of this variable. For the three legislatures 
of the Second Republic, we have used the small booklets that were published by the chamber, and 
which provide an alphabetical list of all deputies, giving details of the district they represent and their 
address, as well as other typewritten sheets that classify the deputies by their party in parliament in the 
constituent assembly, 1934 and 1936. 
11  For a summary of the years from the 1830s to the 1920s, see Varela Ortega and López Blanco (1990: 
202-3). 
12  Organic laws, which were introduced in Spain following the French model, required an absolute ma-
jority in the lower – or single chamber – before they could either come into force, be modified, or be 
derogated. 
13  According to Varela Ortega and López Blanco, ‘universal suffrage was introduced [in 1868 and 1890] 
well before it could develop into the Progressive and Liberal parties’ main demand. Actually up to 
1870s, the priority for Progressives of all shades was access to power’ (1990: 185). 
14  The Progressives controlled cabinet for only one-fifth of Isabel’s reign; and only on three occasions 
did their Prime Ministers retain office for more than one year. This contrasts with the ten moderate 
Prime Ministers who remained in office for more than one year (Artola 1990: 183-4). 
15  See Artola 1991; Ramírez 2000: 30; and Solé and Aja: 1977, 62. 
16  Serrano, who retained Prime Ministerial authority until Martínez Campos’s pronunciamiento, was suc-
ceeded by another general, Zavala, who had also served as a minister twice (State and Navy) under 
Isabel II, and Mateo-Sagasta, who had been a member of the Revolutionary Council (Junta Revolu-
cionaria) before going on to become a minister, then Prime Minister. 
17  Cánovas was the son of a school teacher, while Sagasta’s father was a merchant in a medium sized 
town in Castile. 
18  It has been said that a ‘secret pact’ was made between Cánovas and Sagasta following a series of meet-
ings that took place after Alfonso XII’s death in 1885, by which the substitution of the conservative 
cabinet by a liberal one was agreed (the so-called Pacto de El Pardo – El Pardo Pact). However, the 
turno pacífico had already existed de facto since 1881. 
19  It is unclear if Alfonso XIII personally instigated the coup – a belief that was shared by large sectors of 
the political class – or whether he just accepted it (Tusell 1987; Calero 1988: 90). 
20  That picture does not change when considering the position of member of the Consultative Assembly 
as an equivalent of deputy. Only four members of the former body return to its successor in 1931, and 
in 1933, 16 – 4.5 percent – even if there were a large bloc of right and center-right deputies, most of 
whom lost their seats in 1936 (Linz 1972: 572). 
21  In September 1936, Francisco Franco was elected Head of the Government of the State (Jefe del Gobi-
erno del Estado) by his colleagues in the Defense Council (Junta de Defensa). This was an equivocal 
title that enabled him to become Head of State (Jefe del Estado) just two days later (when the official 
record issued the formal appointment), and Head of Government (Jefe de Gobierno) in January 1938 
(it was not until June 1973 that he was to appoint Admiral Carrero Blanco to replace him in the latter 
position). Additionally, the law of April 1937 made Franco head of the official party. Unlike in Italy 
and Portugal, where the Head of State and Head of Government remained clearly separate, the 
situation in Spain became confused: “Since the same individual exercised both functions, together with 
the power that each of them gave, personal and institutional factors were superimposed” (Baena del 
Alcázar 2002: 326).   48
22  The difficulties of periodising the Franco Regime, and distinguishing cabinets as units of analysis, as 
well as characterising individual ministers by ‘political families’ are analysed by Amando de Miguel 
(1975). 
23  Speaking as the Minister and Secretary General of the almost defunct official single party, Suárez had 
made a complex appeal to Cortes in which he argued that liberalization and, eventually, democratiza-
tion was necessary. This speech was apparently instrumental in leading the King to appoint Suárez, a 
man of his own generation, as the successor to the clearly floundering Arias (Linz and Stepan 1996: 
93). For more on the appointment of Suárez, see Colomer (1995). 
24  The following measures preceded these elections: in March, a wider amnesty (the July 1976 amnesty 
excluded those individuals who had made attempts against the life or integrity of any individual), and 
a new electoral procedure, also approved by decree, was introduced; in April the official party 
structures, including the vertical unions, were dismantled, and the Communist Party and opposition 
labor organizations were legalized on the personal decision of Prime Minister Suárez. 
25  As a result of a second reshuffle of Aznar’s second government in early July 2002, four more indi-
viduals have attained cabinet rank. 
26  Pío Cabanillas Gallas, the most prominent liberal in Arias’s first cabinet, in which he held the Informa-
tion and Tourism portfolio, and bête noire of the Franco ‘bunker.’ He was dismissed, ‘on Franco’s in-
sistence’ after eight months in office (Carr and Fusi 1981: 200). Only one other of Franco’s ministers 
obtained a position in the executive during the Parliamentary Monarchy, although only at the regional 
level: Manuel Fraga, founder of Alianza Popular, was elected president of the Galician government in 
late 1987, after having served as leader of the parliamentary opposition during the preceeding five 
years. 
27  The difference exists only when we count the ministers in constitutional governments – that is, those 
after 1979 – who occupied a position in non-democratic governments (one in the final government of 
the Franco Regime, and seven in those of Juan Carlos’s first governments). Suárez’s first 
constitutional government incorporated the majority of them. 
28  According to Laura Román data for the period 1975-1982, 88.2 percent of the appointments to the po-
sition of Vice Prime Minister and 75.2 percent of ministerial appointments were given to individuals 
who had held senior political positions within the executive (Director General or higher) during the 
previous regime, or who had at least been appointed in those years (1977, 88 ff.). 
29  For example, during the final phase of the regime, some university rectors and the heads of official 
professional associations had been appointed because they had been elected in relatively free elections. 
30  As had happened with the UCD’s ministers, the fact that the proportion of former procuradores 
among the centrist parliamentarians had declined from 16.3 percent in 1977 to 12.5 percent in 1979. 
While some of these individuals had participated in the democratic opposition, their biographical 
details reveal that a large proportion of them had such a background. Obviously these were not the 
only ones that had been linked to Franco’s regime at some point. It is certain that, according to 
Tezanos’s estimates for the Constituent Assembly, some 44 percent of UCD’s deputies had occupied 
political positions at that time, especially at the intermediate levels of the central executive authority, 
as well as at the local level and within the trade union apparatus (Del Campo et.al. 1982: 37-8). 
31  Pradera (1988) argues that this interpretation had become unsustainable as a consequence of Gon-
zález’s 1988 reshuffle that enabled the independent writer, Jorge Semprún, and the veteran socialist 
leader, Enrique Múgica, to enter PSOE’s second government. These men entered politics in the 1940s 
and 1950s, respectively. Paradoxically, it was the consolidation of democracy that, with the exceptions 
noted above, that signalled the political death of those generations. 
32  There were three Catalan Prime Ministers, and at least one Catalan is each ministry during the Sexenio; 
however, during the early Restoration period, no Catalans entered government until 1890. Catalan 
presence increased to two ministers in the years 1917-1918 (García Prieto’s and Maura’s cabinets), a 
number that was not reached again until the Second Republic’s provisional and constituent 
governments, before peaking during Largo Caballero’s second cabinet. Economic and education 
portfolios were the most common positions awarded to Catalans, and it was not until the Parliamentary 
Monarchy that a Catalan was to be appointed to either Defense or Foreign Affairs (Ainaud: 1996). 
33  Guttsman (1963: 77, 102, 106), who defines aristocracy as ‘all those who were descended from a hold-
er of a hereditary title during their grandparents’ generation, thus excluding the sons of the newly en-
nobled and those others who had received hereditary titles themselves’, finds that forty-nine of the 101   49
cabinet ministers between 1886 and 1916 were ‘aristocrats’ (26 of 47 Conservatives, and twenty-three 
of fifty-three Liberals), while from 1916 to 1955, there were thirty-eight aristocrats from 186 ministers 
(thirty-one of ninety-eight Conservatives, including four Labor cabinet members). See chapters V and 
VI on the role of aristocracy in politics. 
34  Luis Companys, who was a minister in Azaña’s government before becoming President of the Catalan 
Generalitat in 1934, was the only exception, since his mother was a member of the titled aristocracy. 
35  During both the transition period and the Parliamentary Monarchy, only three ministers had 
aristocratic titles: Areilza – who was a member of Juan Carlos’s first cabinet – and Soledad Becerril 
and Esperanza Aguirre, of the UCD and PP, respectively. 
36  The list of ministers who were also Freemasons was taken from the Salamanca Archive, which was 
made available to the authors by Professor Luis P. Martín of the University of Clermont Ferranf, 
France.  50
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